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NON-PROCRUSTEAN BANKRUPTCY'
Richard M. Hynes*
Many advocates of bankruptcy reform bristle at aspects of the
bankruptcy system they find distributively "unfair." These scholars
point to the instances in which wealthy debtors have been able to re-
tain million-dollar homes and luxury items, examples which at first
glance might offend any reasonable sense of decency or fairness. Yet
if bankruptcy provides insurance otherwise unavailable because of
market failures, then an ideal bankruptcy system would embrace
much of this inequality in post-bankruptcy standards of living. The
wealthy generally choose private contracts that ensure their high stan-
dards of living. Though others envy these benefits, they do not wish
to pay the premiums these policies require. To the extent that credit
markets force a debtor to pay premiums (in the form of higher inter-
est rates) for the debt relief she would likely receive, forcing all debt-
ors to accept the same standard of living forces each debtor to accept
the same Procrustean insurance that is too meager for some and too
dear for others. This argument requires strong assumptions that rea-
sonable minds may reject. If one rejects these assumptions, however,
then one must question not only the debt relief secured by upper-class
bankrupts, but also the debt relief offered to the middle class.
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"Procrustes-legendary robber of ancient Greece who forced his vic-
tims to fit a certain bed by stretching or lopping off their legs. "'
A central premise underlies the movement for bankruptcy reform:
wealthy debtors abuse bankruptcy protection by defaulting on their obli-
gations while maintaining an excessively comfortable lifestyle beyond the
reach of ordinary Americans.2 Many associate bankruptcy abuse with
the use of homestead exemptions to shield multimillion dollar mansions.3
The consumer credit industry, however, has not focused its lobbying ef-
forts on exemption reform,4 and pending legislation fails to eliminate this
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1809 (Philip Babcock Gove ed.,
1993).
2. See, e.g., Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 177, 183 ("Society should not broadly afford relief to well-off, able-bodied debtors when poorer
people, who have not elected that remedy, struggle to keep their commitments and live within their
means.").
3. For example, over sixty-five law professors signed a letter to Sen. Patrick Leahy advocating a
cap on state homestead exemptions because of the "fundamental problem of unfairness" that large
homestead exemptions create. Letter from Barry E. Adler et al., to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May 22, 2002)
[hereinafter May 2002 Letter from Professors] (on file with the author).
4. In fact, credit card companies may have opposed limitations on homestead exemptions in
order to limit opposition from politicians in states with unlimited exemptions. See, e.g., Dan Morgan,
GAO: 'Homestead Exemption' Aids Well-off Few: Bush, Texas Officials on Record As Opposing Move
to Limit Bankruptcy Shelter, WASH. POST, July 18, 1999, at A6 ("Texans also found allies in credit card
company lobbyists who worked against a tough limitation [for homestead exemptions] on grounds that
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form of "abuse."5 The consumer credit industry's primary goal is to im-
pose some sort of "means-testing" in bankruptcy that would limit the
bankruptcy relief offered to those Americans who possess an above av-
erage income.6
Though law professors overwhelmingly oppose the pending bank-
ruptcy reform legislation,7 they do not question the basic definition of
bankruptcy abuse. Rather, they argue that the reformers exaggerate the
incidence of such abuse' and that the reforms would generate administra-
tive costs that would far outweigh any plausible benefits and impose an
unacceptable burden on the poor.9 Some scholars may oppose means-
testing on the grounds that those with incomes slightly above the median
do not enjoy an excessively comfortable lifestyle and, therefore, are not
abusing the bankruptcy code. ° Yet, even these scholars would agree that
very wealthy debtors who use bankruptcy and similar laws to protect mil-
lions of dollars in home equity or other assets abuse our system of debt
relief." Indeed, academics are nearly unanimous in calling for exemption
such a provision would turn Texas and Florida legislators against the bankruptcy bill and doom
chances of reform.").
5. The legislation would limit homestead exemptions in bankruptcy to $125,000 per person in
some instances. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745,
107th Cong. § 322 (2002). Well-counseled debtors might still be able to bypass this limit, however.
See, e.g., May 2002 Letter from Professors, supra note 3. For a further discussion of exemptions, see
infra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
6. The reforms prohibit debtors from filing under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code if they
have income above the median of the state in which they live and this income is sufficient, after de-
ducting for prescribed living expenses, to repay a significant amount of debt. Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 102 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 48 (2001) ("About 100 professors have written Congress on four separate occasions
imploring Congress not to pass [the bankruptcy reform bills]. Exactly two law professors have urged
passage.") (footnotes omitted).
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1080-84 (1998) (argu-
ing that rising consumer debt is primarily responsible for the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings).
9. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing As a
Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposals As a Starting Point, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998). Given that means-testing would only apply to those debtors with
an income above the median, some question the extent to which the reforms would negatively impact
the poor. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 184 ("By its express terms, this means-testing
provision applies only to those debtors whose income exceeds the national median.... Thus it simply
has no impact on the hundreds of thousands of debtors who are poor.").
10. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) (chronicling the plight of middle-class debtors
in financial distress).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 483, 494 (1997) [hereinafter Warren, Principled Approach] ("When a celebrity can make
headlines by avoiding millions in debts by buying beachfront property in a fancy Florida resort, the
whole bankruptcy system suffers.") (footnote omitted); Warren, supra note 8, at 1084 ("For example,
if the law permits an individual to convey all her property to a self-settled trust while she shields mil-
lions of dollars from her creditors, the practice must be curtailed even if it is a rare event because it is
unfair to creditors and a violation of underlying bankruptcy principles.").
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reforms that are much more substantial than those ultimately embraced
by Congress. 2
This article rejects the definition of abuse adopted by both the sup-
porters and opponents of the pending bankruptcy reforms, and argues
this definition of abuse relies on a Procrustean 3 definition of excessively
comfortable lifestyle that is inconsistent with consumer bankruptcy's role
as a form of social insurance. 4 At its core, this article defends the
marked inequality of U.S. debt relief laws. At first glance, this is a diffi-
cult task. Because these laws protect the debtor's income and assets,
they sometimes allow wealthy or upper-income debtors to continue a
comfortable lifestyle, while offering little help for the truly poor who lack
anything significant to protect. 15  Moreover, these laws sometimes re-
quire poor debtors to repay their loans, while the debts of their wealth-
ier, and better informed, neighbors are forgiven. 6 This article makes a
case for allowing wealthier debtors to maintain a higher standard of liv-
ing than middle-class or poor debtors after default. This argument re-
quires strong assumptions that reasonable minds may reject; however, if
one rejects these assumptions, one must question not only the relief se-
cured by the wealthy deadbeats reported in the papers, but also the relief
offered to the middle class.
This article examines two possible justifications for allowing some
defaulting debtors to maintain a higher standard of living than others.
The first justification relates to the need to provide the debtor with an
incentive to work or to engage in other behavior that we find desirable. 7
This justification grudgingly accepts inequality because of the inability of
12. For example, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission called for caps on homestead
exemptions that would apply in all instances, NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REP. 125 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT], a call that was echoed by over
sixty-five law professors. See May 2002 Letter from Professors, supra note 3. Much of the academic
literature calls for even more dramatic reforms, such as the wholesale replacement of existing property
exemptions with a single exemption that allows the debtor to exempt the property of her choice. See
Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678 (1960);
Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1959). For a more recent
article repeating this call, see Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L.
REV 851, 867-70 (1999).
13. See supra text accompanying note 1.
14. See infra Section VI.C.
15. See, e.g., Mendales, supra note 12, at 863-64 ("As § 522 is now structured, the system dis-
criminates against renters in favor of homeowners, against urbanites in favor of rural residents-
particularly farmers-and more generally against the poor in favor of the well-to-do. This is true not
only for debtors residing in opt-out states, but even for those who can and do elect the federal list of
exemptions. It is not only strange to see this in a consumer bankruptcy system, but it goes against the
basic principles of equity that are supposed to drive the bankruptcy process.") (footnotes omitted);
William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV.
769, 770 (1980) ("Another general defect of exemption laws is that they tend to perpetuate our eco-
nomic class structure. Those who have are allowed to keep; those who do not have are given noth-
ing.").
16. See, e.g., Warren, Principled Approach, supra note 11, at 495 ("In a complex system, debtors
with zealous representation and ample resources can always prosper. At the same time, the system
fails to provide even minimal protection to debtors without such resources.").
17. See infra Section lI.B.
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government to implement a Utopian system that would be both equita-
ble and efficient. 8 Surprisingly, however, the existing inequality of debt
relief laws does little to create these desirable incentives. 9
This article advances a second justification for inequality based on
the role of debt relief as a form of insurance made necessary by various
market failures. 2 This justification for inequality is independent of the
need to encourage a debtor to work and it ultimately rejects the idea that
even a Utopian system of debt relief would afford all debtors the same
standard of living. Just as consumers choose private insurance contracts
that guarantee them different standards of living based on their wealth
and their preferences, so too would consumers choose debt relief laws
that guaranteed them different standards of living. When providing the
protection that an individual should have purchased, the government
should, to the extent possible, respect these differences. 21 As a conse-
quence, one cannot conclude that the wealthy debtor abuses bankruptcy
by retaining a lifestyle unavailable to the average American; she may
well have bargained for this level of protection. Similarly, one cannot
absolve those who retain mere "ordinary" standards of living; they may
have chosen a much lower level of protection.
This basic argument requires qualification. If the debt relief af-
forded the wealthy or upper-middle class imposes significant costs on the
poor or society in general, then the government should not provide the
wealthy with the generous protection that they should have purchased
themselves. There are, however, reasons to believe that the wealthy bear
most of the costs associated with the generous protection they receive.22
Because consumers are free to purchase insurance in private mar-
kets, one must carefully examine the source of market failure that makes
government-mandated insurance necessary. Some common arguments
in favor of debt relief do not justify inequality because they do not justify
the standard of living that our current system affords the wealthy or even
the middle class. 3 If insurance markets suffer from other forms of mar-
ket failure, however, then the government is correct to allow some bank-
rupt debtors to retain a lifestyle beyond the reach of the rest of us.24
18. This is the equity-efficiency trade off discussed in the welfare economics literature. See, e.g.,
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1006 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
19. See infra Section lI.B.
20. This theory that debt relief can provide insurance has been discussed extensively in the lit-
erature. See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A His-
torical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (1986) (providing a particularly
good overview of the justifications for the fresh start of bankruptcy). This article contributes to the
literature by applying the insurance theory of debt relief to the question of inequality.
21. See infra Section III.
22. See infra Section IV.
23. See infra Section V.A.
24. See infra Sections V.B, V.C.
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Other laws designed to protect consumers against misfortune, such
as unemployment insurance or workers' compensation, provide a useful
analogy to debt relief. Unlike laws designed to relieve poverty, these
programs provide benefits to the wealthy, as well as the destitute.25 In
fact, each of these programs provides moderate-income individuals with
significantly greater benefits than the truly poor.26 In contrast to bank-
ruptcy, however, these social insurance programs are generally struc-
tured so that those with very large incomes receive roughly the same
benefits as those who earn only the median income.27 Because the pro-
posed bankruptcy reforms limit the debt relief afforded to the debtors
with above average income,' they would seem to merely align debt relief
with these other elements of the social safety net. One can still argue in
favor of generous relief for the wealthy and upper-middle class, but to do
so one must either argue that social insurance programs are wrongly
structured or that debt relief is relevantly different.2 9
Section I provides a brief overview of the scope of the inequality in
debtor-creditor law and how the proposed reforms affect this inequality.
Section II presents the standard arguments against the inequality of debt
relief and the role that incentives play in tempering egalitarian impulses.
Section III sets forth the basic argument that debt relief laws designed to
insure debtors against misfortune would provide wealthier debtors with
more relief than the poor. Section IV qualifies this argument to the ex-
tent that the debt relief afforded the wealthy adversely impacts third par-
ties. Section V examines the market failures that justify government in-
tervention and questions whether they justify the inequality of debt
relief. As debt relief is not the only form of mandatory insurance, Sec-
tion VI examines government-sponsored social insurance programs and
finds that although these too provide more generous benefits to wealth-
ier individuals, these programs generally do not afford higher-income in-
dividuals significantly greater relief than the average American. Section
VII concludes the article.
I. THE INEQUALITY OF DEBT RELIEF
Even after they default on their obligations, the very wealthy are
able to enjoy a lifestyle most Americans can only imagine. Bankruptcy
abuse has received most of the recent attention, but wealthy debtors can
also use various protections afforded by state and federal nonbankruptcy
law to retain substantial income and assets without filing for bank-
25. See infra notes 325, 371-73 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 347-52 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Section VI.
[Vol. 2004
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ruptcy.3° Therefore, this article addresses the inequality of debt relief
laws more generally rather than limiting itself to the bankruptcy code.
Although newspapers tend to focus on the tales of celebrities or
very wealthy individuals who default on their loans,31 one must recognize
that the inequality of debt relief operates on another level, as well. Debt
relief laws allow those with moderate to high incomes to maintain a
higher standard of living than the truly poor-and the arguments mus-
tered against the bankruptcy abuse of the wealthy may have implications
for this inequality as well.
To better understand the inequality of debtor-creditor law, consider
three hypothetical debtors: Adam, Brian, and Clara. Adam and Brian
work at a company owned by Clara. Adam earns only the minimum
wage, $5.15 per hour32 or approximately $10,300 annually.33 His only as-
sets are some clothes and modest household furnishings. Brian's house-
hold income of $90,000 places him within the top twenty percent of
Americans.' In addition to clothes and household furnishings, Brian
owns a $150,000 home 35 and has an ERISA qualified retirement plan.
The company pays Clara a $1,000,000 salary and provides her with a very
generous ERISA qualified retirement plan. In addition, she owns a
$5,000,000 home and some financial assets.
A temporary recession leads to severe financial difficulties at
Clara's company, and she lays off Adam and Brian. After some time, the
company's prospects improve and Clara rehires each of them at their
previous wages. All three borrowed substantial amounts from Unse-
cured Financeco, though none granted Unsecured Financeco a secured
interest in his or her property. Additionally, Brian borrowed $100,000
30. To give two well-chronicled examples, while former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn re-
tained a multimillion dollar home and O.J. Simpson retains generous pensions, neither debtor filed for
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Charles A. Jaffe, Fallen Stars, There Are Lessons for All of Us in the Riches-to-
Rags Stories of Celebrities, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 1997, available at 1997 WL 3537654; George Ka-
logerakis et al., Red Alert! Bad Investments and Costly Hairpieces Helped Bankrupt Burt Reynolds, but
He's Not the Only Star Who Has Been Down and out in Beverly Hills: How to Go Broke on Several
Million a Year, PEOPLE, Feb. 24, 1997, at 101; Dan Morgan, Bush Opposes Limiting Texas Bankruptcy
Shelter, WASH. POST, July 18, 1999, at A6.
31. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 30; Kalogerakis et al., supra note 30.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
33. This assumes he works forty hours a week and fifty weeks a year.
34. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-HOUSEHOLDS (2002), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h01.htm (last revised Sept. 30, 2002). Brian is assigned an
income of $90,000 to ensure that his income would be above the median income for a family of four in
every state. Connecticut has the highest median family income, $82,702. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
MEDIAN INCOME FOR 4-PERSON FAMILIES, BY STATE (2002) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 4-
PERSON FAMILIES], available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html (last revised Oct. 8,
2003).
35. Although certainly not extravagant and probably quite modest in some markets, this home
would still be more valuable than the average American home. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERI-
CAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2001 146 (2002), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2002pubs/h150-01.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) (stating that the American Housing Survey
for the United States in 2001 found the median value of an owner-occupied home to be $123,887).
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from Secured Bank,36 and he granted Secured Bank a mortgage on his
home. Each debtor now finds his or her debts unmanageable and seeks
some form of relief under the law.
A. Nonbankruptcy Collections
Much of the inequality of bankruptcy results from the bankruptcy
code's incorporation of nonbankruptcy substantive law.37 Also, non-
bankruptcy collections law remains vital in its own right, as the majority
of debtors who default probably do not file for bankruptcy.38 Therefore,
assume Adam, Brian, and Clara fail to pay their obligations but do not
file for bankruptcy. Instead, they simply let their creditors pursue them
in state court. The relevant state and federal nonbankruptcy laws would
protect some of the income and the assets of each debtor.
1. Protection of Assets -Exemptions and Other Devices
In discussing debt relief laws, this article focuses on those laws that
limit Unsecured Financeo's ability to collect. These laws will not affect
Secured Bank's powerful collection tool, its ability to foreclose on
Brian's home if it is not paid. This foreclosure right results in dramati-
cally lower charge-off rates for mortgage lenders than for unsecured
lenders, such as credit card companies.39 In fact, this threat is so powerful
that many debtors try desperately to repay their mortgage lender, even if
their efforts otherwise lead to financial ruin4°-and this article will as-
sume that Brian will do everything in his power to repay Secured Bank.
States have enacted laws that limit the ability of Secured Bank to fore-
close,43 but these laws generally have little to do with the tales of abuse
that fill the newspapers.
36. For the purposes of this analysis, it does not matter if Brian borrowed this money to pur-
chase his home or if he used a home equity loan to finance other needs.
37. For example, bankrupt debtors can invoke the property exemptions available to them under
nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000).
38. See, e.g., AM. BANKER'S ASS'N, 1997 INSTALLMENT CREDIT SURVEY REPORT 109 (9th ed.
1997) (reporting that approximately seventy percent of all bank consumer credit losses occur outside
of bankruptcy). Of course, this figure represents a percentage of the dollar amount of outstanding
obligations rather than individuals, and it is possible that some individuals file for bankruptcy long
after their creditors account for their debt as unlikely to be repaid. This figure clearly implies, how-
ever, that a large number of debtors who fail to repay their loans do not file for bankruptcy.
39. While the average charge-off rate for credit card loans in the year 2001 was approximately
5.48%, the average charge-off rate for residential real estate loans was just 0.24%. See FED. RESERVE
BD., CHARGE-OFF RATES, ALL BANKS, NSA (2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/chargeoff//chgallnsa.txt (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
40. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 199-237 (describing the
"house-poor").
41. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
133-34 (3d ed. 1997); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA.
L. REV. 489, 526-30 (1991).
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Even though the debtors did not grant Unsecured Financeco a
mortgage, Unsecured Financeco could obtain a judgment and ask a court
to attach a lien to a debtor's home or other assets.42 State and federal
law, however, will protect some of each debtor's property from attach-
ment,43 and, as a general rule, Clara will be able to protect more assets
than Brian and Brian will protect more assets than Adam.
The most famous exemptions 4 are the so-called unlimited home-
stead exemptions, found in seven states,45 that would allow Clara to keep
her five million dollar home as long as her home is on a sufficiently small
lot or if she lives in a rural area.46 These laws would also allow Brian to
shield his home, or more accurately his home equity, from Unsecured
Financeco, but he has only $50,000 of home equity to protect. These
laws are of no use to Adam because he has no home.47 In fact, Adam
does not really have anything of value to protect other than his clothes
and household possessions, and the laws of every state would protect
these meager belongings.
Most states do place some limit on their homestead exemptions, and
although the exemptions of some states are quite large,' most limits
would seem reasonable to those with middle- or upper-middle-class sen-
sibilities. For example, roughly twenty percent of all states allow married
debtors to exempt less than $11,000 of home equity, and twenty-eight
states allow married debtors to exempt $50,000 or less. 9
If one compares these limitations to the actual home equity held by
American households, no longer appear so modest. Approximately
thirty-one percent of American households do not own a home and
42. For a more thorough description of a judgment creditor's collection remedies, see ELIZA-
BETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 45-50
(2001).
43. The laws that protect the debtor's assets are commonly referred to as exemptions. For a col-
lection of the exemptions offered by the federal government and each of the fifty states, see, for exam-
ple, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY J1 522.01 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter COLLIER].
44. One reason that the homestead exemptions may have captured the public's imagination is
that home equity is by far the most significant asset of American households, representing approxi-
mately forty-four percent of individual net worth in the United States. See MICHAEL E. DAVERN &
PATRICIA J. FISHER, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION v-vii (2001). In addition, a few celebrities have used this exemption to protect large
amounts of wealth. See, e.g., Kalogerakis et al., supra note 30.
45. Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont currently place no
limit on the amount of home equity that some of their debtors may exempt. See infra tbl.1.
46. For example, Texas allows a debtor to exempt her home equity as long as her home is on a
lot of less than ten acres in a town, village, or city, or on a lot less than one hundred acres (200 for a
family) elsewhere. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001-.002 (Vernon 2000).
47. Some states allow nonhomeowners to apply some or all of the homestead exemption toward
other property. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003), 34-18 & -20 (Michie
1996). However, none of the states with "unlimited" homestead exemptions give debtors this option.
48. For example, Minnesota has a homestead exemption of $200,000. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 510.01-02 (West 2002), 550.37.12 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
49. See infra tbl.1. Of course, some of the states that have homestead exemptions less than
$11,000 allow their debtors to use the federal exemptions in bankruptcy. See infra tbl.1.
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therefore have no home equity." In 1995, the median homeowner had
approximately $50,000 in home equity, 1 meaning that roughly half of all
homeowners could exempt all of their home equity in almost half of all
states. But bankrupt homeowners typically do not have anywhere near
this amount of home equity; a recent study found that in 1991, the me-
dian equity of homeowners in bankruptcy was just $5,500.12
Although most homestead exemptions would be insufficient to pro-
tect Clara's mansion, she can find other ways to protect her substantial
wealth even if her state provides no homestead exemption at all. For ex-
ample, if she owns her home jointly with her husband and she recorded
their deed in the form of tenancy by the entirety, then several states
would prevent Unsecured Financeco from seizing Clara's home unless
her husband co-signed the loan. 3 Clara could also place her home in an
asset protection trust or a spendthrift trust, thereby placing it beyond the
reach of her creditors. 4 Clara may also wish to use these trusts to protect
her financial assets, as few states have exemptions that would exempt a
significant amount of this wealth." Finally, Clara could have avoided
personal liability altogether by incorporating her business and incurring
the debts through that entity.56
Though state property exemptions have received most of the recent
attention, federal nonbankruptcy law could enable Brian, and especially
Clara, to exempt a significant amount of wealth as well. Most federal
nonbankruptcy exemptions will not apply to our three debtors because
these exemptions are confined to Social Security benefits, 7 certain assets
50. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCY SURVEY, FOURTH QUARTER 2003, at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q403tab5.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
51. See DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 44, at v-vii.
52. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK., supra note 10, at 221. Even adjusted for inflation,
this represents just $7,263.24 in year 2002 dollars. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER
PRICE INDEX-ALL URBAN CONSUMERS, at http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet (last vis-
ited Sept. 2, 2003).
53. An excellent, if somewhat dated, survey of this doctrine in each of the states can be found in
Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977). Recently, however, the United States Supreme
Court substantially weakened this doctrine, holding that federal tax liens do attach to a debtor's inter-
est in property held in the form of tenancy by the entireties. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274
(2002). Significantly, several of the states that protect property held in the form of tenancy by the en-
tirety are frequently listed as having no homestead protection. See, e.g., Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning
up the Pigsty: Approaching Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 276 (2000) (not-
ing lack of homestead exemption in Delaware); Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of
Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 n.8 (1997) (noting lack of homestead exemption in Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island, but acknowledging that federal bankruptcy exemptions are available in
those states).
54. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It
Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994).
55. Clara may be able to protect some of her financial assets with a wildcard exemption that can
apply to any personal property. Although this may appear promising for Clara, the dollar limits on
these exemptions are typically fairly low when compared to her wealth. See infra tbll.
56. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1984).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
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held only by federal employees (such as bankruptcy judges), 8 and other
narrowly defined groups. 9 Federal law does prohibit the assignment or
alienation of many pension benefits,' and thus may protect the retire-
ment benefits of both Brian and Clara.6 In Clara's case, these benefits
may be extremely generous, and even if her plan does not meet the re-
quirements of ERISA, she still may be able to use state law to protect re-
tirement accounts worth well in excess of a million dollars.62
2. Protection of Income- Limitations on Garnishment
After obtaining a judgment, Unsecured Financeco can also seek a
garnishment order that would force the employer to pay a portion of
each debtor's earnings directly to it. Because federal law exempts the
greater of seventy-five percent of the debtor's take-home pay or thirty
times the federal minimum wage per week,63 debtors with higher earn-
ings will be allowed to exempt a greater amount from their creditors. In
our example, Adam would exempt $7,725 of annual income from his
creditors, 64 an amount that would put him well below the poverty line
even if he were single and had no children. Meanwhile, ignoring taxes,
Brian would exempt approximately $67,500 and Clara would exempt
$750,000.
B. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy largely continues the inequality found in nonbank-
ruptcy collections law and would continue to do so, even if the pending
58. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 376(n) (2000) (exempting annuities paid to survivors of judges, including
bankruptcy judges).
59. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 543, 545 (2000) (discussing Klamath Indian tribes in Oregon); 33
U.S.C. § 916 (2000) (exempting death and disability benefits paid pursuant to the Longshore and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act).
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000) (requiring that pension plans prohibit the assignment or
alienation of benefits).
61. It is this exemption that allows O.J. Simpson to live off of his pensions while the tort judg-
ment against him remains unpaid. See, e.g., Kalogerakis et al., supra note 30.
62. See, e.g., In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that although a debtor filed for
bankruptcy, his individual retirement accounts worth approximately $1,400,000 were exempt under
Maryland nonbankruptcy law as well).
63. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000) (restricting garnishment in favor
of general creditors to no more than the lesser of twenty-five percent of the debtor's "disposable in-
come" or the amount by which her disposable income exceeds thirty times the federal minimum
wage). "Disposable income" is roughly the debtor's take-home pay. Some states further limit gar-
nishment or prohibit it altogether. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(1) (Vernon 2000)
(prohibiting garnishment of earned but unpaid wages).
64. A debtor may exempt thirty times the federal minimum wage each week, or $154.50. Assum-
ing the debtor works fifty weeks a year, this equals $7,725 a year.
65. In 2001, the poverty threshold for an individual with no children was $9,214. See U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR 2001, BY SIZE OF FAMILY AND NUMBER OF RELATED
CHILDREN, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresho1.html (last revised Sept.
24, 2002). The poverty threshold for a family of four with two children under the age of eighteen was
$17,960. Id.
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reforms were enacted. In this example, Clara would still enjoy a much
higher standard of living after default than Brian, and Brian would enjoy
a much higher standard of living than Adam. Perhaps this is unsurprising
because bankruptcy law has always relied on nonbankruptcy collections
law to determine many of the substantive rights of the participants.66 But
the inequality of bankruptcy is not merely due to this incorporation of
nonbankruptcy rights. To see the source and scope of the inequality, as-
sume that each of our three debtors finds that nonbankruptcy law pro-
vides inadequate protection and, therefore, joins the growing number of
individuals who file for bankruptcy.67
1. Chapter 7: "Straight Bankruptcy"
The most dramatic benefit of a Chapter 7 filing, the discharge of all
of an individual's debts,' contributes to the inequality of debt relief.
Today, Clara may be able to use this discharge to protect her entire one
million dollar salary rather than just the portion protected from garnish-
ment under nonbankruptcy law.69 Brian and Adam could obtain this
same discharge, but it would only protect earnings of $90,000 and
$10,300, respectively. Therefore, like nonbankruptcy limitations on gar-
nishment, Chapter 7 allows those who earn more to keep more; in fact,
the discharge allows individuals to keep all of their future earnings.
If the proposed reforms were to pass, however, then Clara and
Brian would probably be ineligible for relief under Chapter 7. The pro-
posed reforms prevent a debtor from receiving relief in Chapter 7 if the
difference between her income and certain prescribed living expenses
would allow her to repay a sufficient amount of debt.7° Therefore, this
legislation effectively limits the standard of living that a debtor can fi-
nance out of her income, but it does not eliminate the disparity in living
standards. First, this means-testing only applies to those debtors with
household income above the median for similar households in their
state;71 nationally, the median household income for a family of four in
the year 2000 was about $62,000.72 Although this income does not make
a household wealthy, a household with this income still earns approxi-
mately six times as much as a minimum wage worker, such as Adam.
Moreover, as more fully discussed below, bankruptcy courts allow
66. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
67. Adam may be unable to hire a lawyer or even pay the filing fee, but that is a topic for an-
other article.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000).
69. Of course, a court could rule that Clara's filing constitutes a substantial abuse of the bank-
ruptcy code. Id. § 707(b).
70. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th
Cong. § 102(a)(2) (2002).
71. Id.
72. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 4-PERSON FAMILIES, supra note 34. Connecticut had the highest
four person median income, $82,702, and Arkansas the lowest, $44,537. Id.
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higher-income individuals, such as Brian and Clara, to claim living ex-
penses well beyond the reach of the truly poor.73
Even if the proposed legislation makes Brian and Clara ineligible
for relief in Chapter 7, one must still examine how their assets would be
treated in this chapter because the other bankruptcy chapters will deter-
mine their payments by referring to what would have happened if the
rules of Chapter 7 did apply.74 Notwithstanding the proposed reforms,
Clara will retain significantly more assets than Brian, and Brian will re-
tain significantly more assets than Adam because the bankruptcy code
largely incorporates the nonbankruptcy exemptions of the state in which
the debtor lives. 75
Clara may be able to keep her five million dollar home, despite
proposed limits on the homestead exemption in bankruptcy. As long as
she has lived in a state with an unlimited exemption for at least forty
months and her debts do not arise from securities fraud or certain other
bad acts, the proposed cap on the homestead exemption would not ap-
ply.76 Even if she did commit one of the specified bad acts, she might be
able to retain her home if she files jointly with her husband, her husband
is not guilty of these bad acts, and he claims the balance of the equity in
his exemption.77 In addition, Clara may still be able to use spendthrift or
asset protection trusts 78 to protect her substantial wealth, and the pend-
ing legislation would enhance Clara's ability to exempt retirement
funds. 79
Even if the limitations on the homestead exemption did apply, they
would still allow Clara to retain an amount of equity vastly in excess of
that owned by the average American. The proposed limitations would
allow Clara (as an individual) to exempt up to $125,000 in home equity if
also permitted under state law.8 Though this may represent a sharp drop
from the amount that she can now exempt, and the amount that she
would continue to be able to exempt in a state law collections proceed-
73. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (requiring that the debtor repay her unsecured creditors at least as
much as they would have received in Chapter 7); id. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (requiring that each holder of an
impaired claim or interest either accept the plan of reorganization or receive at least as much as she
would have received if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7).
75. Debtors are free to use the property exemptions available to them under state law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(A). The bankruptcy code also includes certain federal, bankruptcy-only exemptions. Id.
§ 522(d). In enacting these exemptions, however, the code gave each state the right to opt-out of these
exemptions and force their debtors to use the state nonbankruptcy property exemptions, and the vast
majority of states quickly did so. See Richard M. Hynes, Anup Malani, & Eric A. Posner, The Political
Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2004).
76. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th
Cong. § 322 (2002).
77. The proposed amendments would still allow joint filers to each claim and exemption and the
plain language of the cap on the homestead exemption applies only if the debtor has committed one of
the specified bad acts. Id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
79. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, § 224.
80. See id. § 322.
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ing, this is still approximately 2.5 times the home equity held by the me-
dian homeowner81 and well in excess of the median home equity held by
households with income in the top twenty percent.82 Because of this high
proposed limit, the cap on the homestead exemption would actually af-
fect very few Americans.
Although most commentators propose exemption reforms that
would apply even if the debtor did not move recently or commit a "bad
act," 83 those writing in the last decade or so have proposed dollar
amounts vastly in excess of the holdings of the average American.' For
example, recent articles that repeat earlier calls for the greater use of
bankruptcy exemptions that can be applied to any property of the
debtor's choosing suggest caps for a married couple between $50,000 and
$100,000.85 By contrast, the median net worth for all American fami-
lies-not just those in financial distress--in 1995 was roughly $40,200,86
and the median net worth for those in the lowest income quartile was just
$5,000.87 Of course, this amount is net of both secured and unsecured
debt, but it is unlikely that adding back unsecured debts would dramati-
cally increase these figures. 88
81. See DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 44, at v-vii.
82. The median home equity for this group is approximately $65,000. Id. at x.
83. Scholars have written too many articles on exemptions to make a true search for a majority
productive. See, e.g., William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The "Opt-out" As Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149
(1997) (stating that his research revealed more 225 exemption articles dated January 1979 through
May 1996). This statement clearly applies to those articles that have received the most attention. See,
e.g., sources cited supra note 12.
84. Articles on exemption reform did not always propose relatively generous amounts. For ex-
ample, the student note that started the chorus in favor of wildcard exemptions proposed a much more
modest exemption of $1,000 in year 1959 dollars. See Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Sugges-
tions, supra note 12, at 1509. This amount would be approximately $6,182 in year 2002. See, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INFLATION CALCULATOR, available at http://data.bls.
gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). Other early articles specified similarly low values.
See, e.g., Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
663, 678 (1968) (suggesting wildcard exemption of $3,900 for a married couple with two children).
85. See, e.g., Mendales, supra note 12, at 867 ("The amount may be left up to debate, although a
figure around $50,000 seems fair as a starting point for legislative bargaining .... As under present
law, two debtors filing jointly as spouses could aggregate their exemptions.").
86. See DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 44, at v. The Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) reports
sharply higher figures for median net worth, $60,900 in 1995, though this amount is still less than the
amount of the proposed exemptions for a married couple. See ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL ET AL., RE-
CENT CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: RESULTS FROM THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FI-
NANCES, at 7 tbl.3, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98fbullOlOO.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2004). Much of the discrepancy between the SCF and the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) can be attributed to the fact that the SCF deliberately over-represents wealthy
individuals in its data and the fact that the SCF uses a broader definition of asset than the SIPP. See
DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 44, at vi-vii. The recently released 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance
reports that median net worth increased sharply to $86,100. See ANA M. AIZCORBE ET AL., RECENT
CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1998 AND 2001 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCES, at 7 tbl.3, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/03bulletin.htm#jan
(last updated Dec. 11, 2003).
87. See DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 44, at v.
88. For example, according to the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance, half of all non-
homeowners had a net worth of less than $4,800. See AIZCORBE ET AL., supra note 86, at 7. Only
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The typical debtor in bankruptcy, moreover, has a much lower
value of asset holdings. According to three leading bankruptcy scholars,
the median bankrupt debtor had just $14,907 in assets in 1991.89 This fig-
ure likely overstates the assets available for exemption because the me-
dian debtor also has $11,519 in secured debts,' and exemptions do not
prevent the secured creditor from seizing her collateral. Even the sev-
enty-fifth percentile of bankrupt debtors may not have much wealth
available for exemption. Although they had $67,859 in assets in 1991,
they also had $53,382 in secured debt.91
The exemption Xproposals by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission (NBRC) were similarly well beyond the assets of the aver-
age American. For example, while the NBRC proposed minimum ex-
emptions for nonhomeowners of $35,000, 93 a leading study found that
half of all bankrupt nonhomeowners had less than $3,775 in assets in
1991.' 4 Even those nonhomeowners who are not bankrupt do not have
many assets. According to the Survey of Consumer Finance, half of all
nonhomeowners had a net worth of less than $4,800 in 2001.' 5 Again, this
low net worth does not appear solely attributable to an excess of debts.
Only sixty-five percent of these nonhomeowners reported any debts at
all; and of those that did list debts, half had debts of less than $6,000.96
2. Chapters 11 and 13: Repayment out of Future Income
Even if denied relief in Chapter 7, Brian and Clara can still find re-
lief in Chapters 11' or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The repayment re-
quirements of these chapters are such that Clara will enjoy a higher stan-
dard of living in bankruptcy than Brian, and Brian will enjoy a higher
standard of living than Adam. To date, few individual debtors have filed
under Chapter 11,98 though this may change if some very high-income
debtors are denied access to Chapter 7 by the proposed reforms and are
sixty-five percent of these nonhomeowners listed any debts at all; and of those that did list debts, half
had debts of less than $6,000. Id. at 23.
89. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 66. This represents approxi-
mately $19,689 in year 2002 dollars.
90. See id. This represents approximately $15,215 in year 2002 dollars.
91. See id. Expressed in 2002 dollars, these figures are $89,133 and $71,431.
92. In 1994, Congress established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to study bank-
ruptcy. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 § 603, 108 Stat. 4106,4147.
93. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 133.
94. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 215. This represents approxi-
mately $4,958 in year 2002 dollars.
95. See AIZCORBE ET AL., supra note 86, at 7.
96. Id. at 23.
97. While one normally associates Chapter 11 with corporate reorganizations, individual debtors
may make use of Chapter 11, as well. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991).
98. For example, in 2001, Chapter 11 filings represented less than five one hundredths of a per-
cent (0.05%) of all nonbusiness bankruptcy filings. See AM. BANKRUPTCY INST., ANNUAL U.S. NON-
BUSINESS FILINGS BY CHAPTER, 2000-2001, available at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/
00stateannualnonbuschapter.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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also denied access to Chapter 13 because they have too much debt." Be-
cause so few debtors have chosen Chapter 11, this section will focus on
Chapter 13.
Roughly stated, a debtor in Chapter 13 proposes a plan in which she
will make payments over a three to five-year period,"° and the debtor is
given a discharge of any remaining debts if she completes her plan.101
The debtor must once again pay her secured creditors in full if she is to
retain the property pledged as collateral."2 But more pertinent to this
article is the amount the debtor must pay to her unsecured creditors.
There are two primary tests for how much the debtor must pay her gen-
eral unsecured creditors in Chapter 13:103 the "best interests of the credi-
tors" test1° and the "projected disposable income" test.y'
The best interests of the creditors test determines the treatment of
the debtor's assets in bankruptcy and requires that the debtor pay her
unsecured creditors at least as much as they would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation." Because this test effectively incorporates the
repayment test of Chapter 7, Clara will once again retain more assets
than Brian, and Brian will retain more assets than Adam. More specifi-
cally, if Clara's mansion or financial assets are somehow protected by a
property exemption or held in a trust,"~ then this wealth will have no ef-
fect on the amount that she must repay in a Chapter 11 or 13 filing. This
possibility is more than idle speculation; in the past, Chapter 13 debtors
have retained significant amounts of wealth in the form of exempt as-
sets.1 08
99. Chapter 13 is restricted to individual debtors (other than stockbrokers and commodity bro-
kers) with regular income who have noncontested, liquidated unsecured debts of less than $290,525
and noncontested liquidated secured debts of less than $871,550. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), (e) (2000) (dollar
amounts updated by revision of certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code prescribed under 11
U.S.C. § 104(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 10.910, 10.911 (Feb. 20, 2001)).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d). A debtor may propose a plan that will last less than three years if she
will repay her creditors in full, but this is rare.
101. Id. § 1328(a).
102. Id. § 1322. This is true in Chapter 11, as well. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
103. Id. § 1325(a)(4). In addition to the best interests of the creditors test and the projected dis-
posable income test discussed below, a few courts still review the debtor's proposed payments under
the good faith standard of Section 1325(a). However, this practice is less common since the addition
of the projected disposable income test in 1984. For a discussion of this issue, see Brandon L. Johnson,
Comment, Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should the Good Faith Inquiry Evaluate the Proposed
Amount of Repayment?, 36 GONz. L. REV. 375, 390-94 (2000-2001) (reviewing cases). Chapter 11's
repayment requirements are set forth in section 1129.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
105. Id. § 1325(b). The pending legislation would add a projected income test to Chapter 11. See
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th Cong.
§ 102(h)(2) (2002).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
107. See supra notes 32-82 and accompanying text (arguing that Clara's wealth may still be ex-
empt even if the proposed legislative reforms are enacted).
108. In one notorious case, a doctor sought to retain over $2,000,000 in exempt assets while dis-
charging liability for three claims of sexual misconduct filed against him by former patients. In re
Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995). Debtors are able to retain some of these assets despite the dis-
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The projected disposable income test appears fairly egalitarian be-
cause it requires the debtor to repay her creditors with all of her "pro-
jected disposable income,"'" or income in excess of her "reasonably nec-
essary" living expenses."' This test appears to leave Adam, Brian, and
Clara with the same standard of living, that which is reasonably necessary
for maintenance or support. The most that bankruptcy can do for Adam,
however, is to allow him to retain all of his meager income and assets.
Therefore, bankruptcy can only equalize each debtor's standard of living
by reducing Clara and Brian to the poverty in which Adam lives.
Though the reasonably necessary standard is notoriously subjec-
tive,"' one can fairly claim that courts allow middle or upper-middle-
class debtors like Brian to claim greater expenses than Adam, but that
they are likely to challenge Clara's efforts to claim greater expenses than
Brian. For example, some courts follow the suggestion of some commen-
tators and "scrutiniz[e] only for luxuries that are not enjoyed by an aver-
age American family.""'  Under this standard, those with moderate in-
comes are able to maintain a higher standard of living than the poor, but
those with higher incomes run the risk that a court could find their
choices of goods and services to represent luxuries." 3 A wealthy debtor
will have a particularly difficult time if she claims a standard of living that
exceeds that of the bankruptcy judge. In the words of one commentator,
"[y]ou cannot expect your client to keep a car that is fancier than the one
that the judge drives." 114
Though courts perhaps scrutinize the expenses of the very rich, this
does not mean that upper-income debtors are unable to claim more ex-
penses. A great many scholars note the inconsistent application of the
reasonably necessary standard, implying that at least some wealthy or
upper-income debtors are able to claim substantial expenses."5 A bigger
concern among academics is that debtors are sometimes able to manipu-
late the disposable income test by purchasing durable goods on secured
credit and thus increase their allowed expenses."6 This approach works
especially well in some jurisdictions because courts do not question
whether payments to secured creditors can be justified under the rea-
posable income test discussed below because courts will generally refuse to impute income not actually
received by the debtor. Id.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
110. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
111. See, e.g., 2 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY §165.1 (3d ed. & Supp. 2002)
("What expenses are 'reasonably necessary...' is a fact question determined in the context of individ-
ual debtors and their dependents. On similar facts, outcomes will vary from judge to judge, from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction, from one part of the country to another and even over time within the same
jurisdiction.").
112. 8 COLLIER, supra note 43, 1325.08[4][b][ii].
113. See In re Zaleski, 216 B.R. 425,431 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1997).
114. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 60 (rev. ed. 1993).
115. See, e.g., 2 LUNDIN, supra note 111, at § 165.1 (summarizing extensive case law).
116. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461,
471-73 (1997).
No. 21
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
sonably necessary standard,'17 thereby avoiding an uncomfortable inquiry
into the appropriateness of the debtor's home or automobile. To the ex-
tent that courts do not question payments on secured debts, debtors with
bigger homes or with more consumer durables are often able to retain
these assets in bankruptcy and thus enjoy a higher standard of living than
other debtors."8 According to one commentator, a debtor can avoid re-
paying anything to her unsecured creditors by accumulating consumer
durables "appropriate to her station in life" prior to filing." 9
The proposed bankruptcy reform legislation tries to further limit
the ability of Brian and Clara to claim a standard of living beyond that of
the average American by providing a more detailed definition of the rea-
sonably necessary standard and by relying more heavily on schedules of
expenses. 2° This legislation, however, does not eliminate the inequality
inherent in this standard. Though all debtors would be forced to disclose
additional information, the means-testing would only apply to the small
number (somewhere between eighteen and twenty-four percent)121 of
bankrupt debtors with incomes above the median in their state and thus
do little to reduce the disparity in the expenses claimed by the great ma-
jority of bankrupt debtors. The expenses implied by the reforms strike
those with upper-middle-class sensibilities as quite low, but they are still
substantially in excess of what Adam can afford and what social assis-
tance programs provide.'22 In addition, until a debtor's income passes
about $70,000 per year, she can generally claim more expenses as her in-
come rises,123 prompting one commentator to question "[d]o wealthier
people have to eat more?" ' 4  More significantly, the enumerated ex-
penses are in addition to any payments that the debtor must make to se-
117. See In re Smith, 196 B.R. 565, 571 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Humphrey, 165 B.R. 508,
510 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Cordes, 147 B.R. 498, 502 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992); In re Jones, 119
B.R. 996, 1000 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990). But see In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1998) (claiming that a majority of courts subject payments made through the plan to the reasonably
necessary test of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2000)).
118. See LoPucki, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. Despite this shift toward more explicit expenses, numerous commentators have criticized the
proposed reforms for relying too heavily on judicial discretion in setting the debtor's living expenses.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 436 (2002).
121. Tabb, supra note 7, at 30 (collecting the results of the relevant studies).
122. For example, the maximum TANF benefit in Virginia is just $410 per month. See STATE
POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY RULES FOR TANF CASH ASSISTANCE:
VIRGINIA, available at http://www.spdp.org/compstates/vafinan.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). By con-
trast, the allowance for food clothing and expenses alone would allow Brian and Clara to spend up to
$1,497 per month if part of a family of four. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL STANDARDS
FOR ALLOWABLE LIVING EXPENSES, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=
104627,00.html (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
123. The Internal Revenue Service schedule referenced by the recent reforms allows debtors with
higher incomes to claim higher allowable living expenses for food, clothing and other expenses. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COLLECTION FINANCIAL STANDARDS, available at http://www.irs.gov/
business/small/article/0,,id=104627,00.htmi (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
124. Tabb, supra note 7, at 24.
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cured creditors,"2' and, as discussed above, wealthier debtors are likely to
have larger secured debt payments because they have more valuable
homes, cars, and household appliances.126
Many scholars believe that courts simply lack the capacity or the
time to conduct any meaningful review of the debtor's household budget,
and that a debtor should instead be assigned some standardized expenses
based on her earnings. 127 Both the NBRC 128 and two leading bankruptcy
economists129 have independently advocated reforms that would do just
this by effectively importing garnishment as a standard collection method
in bankruptcy.13 Though the details of the system advocated by each dif-
fer markedly, both argue that the debtor must repay an amount equal to
some fraction of earnings. 31 Because these proposals effectively allow
debtors to retain some fraction of earnings, they would, like garnishment,
allow higher income debtors to consume more than lower income debt-
ors. Each of these proposals allows for the possibility of progressive
marginal rates to reduce the effect of this inequality.32
II. STANDARD VIEWS OF ABUSE AND INEQUALITY
Bankruptcy scholars often cite stories of wealthy debtors who retain
mansions or other assets in bankruptcy as examples of bankruptcy abuse
or violations of fundamental principles of equity without bothering to
explain why.'33 A few scholars devote some time explaining this seem-
ingly obvious principle." 4 At their core, these explanations are based on
the same principle as progressive taxation: those that can pay more,
should.13' Just as in the taxation context, however, society must at least
tolerate some level of inequality in order to provide debtors with incen-
125. 11 U.S.C. § 707(2)(b)(iv) (2002).
126. See LoPucki, supra note 116.
127. See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 263-73; Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An
Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (2001).
128. See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 263-73.
129. See, e.g., Wang & White, supra note 127. Note that the bankruptcy tax proposed by Profes-
sors Wang and White is effectively the same as garnishment in bankruptcy.
130. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 268; Wang & White, supra note 127.
131. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 268; Wang & White, supra note 127, at 261.
132. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 268; Wang & White, supra note 127, at 281-84.
133. See, e.g., Mendales, supra note 12, at 863-64:
As § 522 is now structured, the system discriminates against renters in favor of homeowners,
against urbanites in favor of rural residents-particularly farmers-and more generally against
the poor in favor of the well-to-do. This is true not only for debtors residing in opt-out states, but
even for those who can and do elect the federal list of exemptions. It is not only strange to see
this in a consumer bankruptcy system, but it goes against the basic principles of equity that are
supposed to drive the bankruptcy process.
Id. May 2002 Letter from Professors, supra note 3 ("In a bill designed to squeeze hard on working
families who have faced unemployment, medical bills and divorce, it is profoundly unfair to leave open
a gaping loophole [potentially unlimited homestead exemptions] for the richest executives, doctors
and media stars.").
134. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 181-83.
135. Id. at 181-82.
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tives to engage in socially useful behavior such as working or cooperating
with the collection process. Surprisingly, however, this incentive value of
inequality does not explain much of the inequality in our debt relief laws
and thus can only serve as a partial justification.
A. Why Abuse and Inequality Trouble Us
Allowing a celebrity or tycoon to retain millions of dollars of assets
in bankruptcy seems so obviously unfair that few would bother explain-
ing why. But one must be careful in describing just what we find trou-
bling. In some of the more notorious cases, these individuals use debt re-
lief laws to avoid repaying claims based on fraud or some other
intentional tort that they have committed.'36 As discussed more fully be-
low, this article does not attempt a defense of the treatment of these
claims or any other obligations not based in contract.'37 Some may sim-
ply object to a world in which some individuals, even those not in default,
can own multimillion dollar homes while others go homeless. Yet, re-
form of the nation's taxation and transfer programs provides a more use-
ful tool for remedying this inequality.'38 This article focuses on what we
find particularly galling about the wealthy who use debt relief laws to
avoid repaying loans willingly extended by lenders.
Many of the arguments against this form of bankruptcy abuse are
incomplete. For example, some argue that such abuse discredits our en-
tire system of debt relief.'39 This argument cannot stand on its own, for it
requires an explanation as to why the public believes that these cases cast
doubt on the efficacy of our system of debt relief; one still needs an ex-
planation for why we find these cases troubling. On the other hand, the
argument that generous debt relief harms creditors and raises the costs of
borrowing for other consumers"4° simply proves too much. To the extent
that this argument is true, 4' it is true for defaults in general.
This incompleteness is not lost on other scholars, and they ground
their opposition to bankruptcy abuse on the fundamental premise that
136. In some of the more notorious cases, financiers have moved to Florida and exempted multi-
million dollar mansions to avoid paying judgments for securities fraud. See, e.g., Leslie A. Shames,
Calling a Fraud a Fraud: Why Congress Should Not Adopt a Uniform Cap on Homestead Exemptions,
16 BANKR. DEV. J. 191 (1999).
137. See infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
139. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 183 ("Finally, a spate of high-profile celebrity,
sports figure, and political bankruptcies, together with the disillusioning experiences of growing num-
bers of bankruptcy creditors has called into question the system's ability to police itself."); Warren,
Principled Approach, supra note 11, at 493-94 ("While the level of abuse may be low, it is nonetheless
important to recognize that public confidence is undermined when any debtor can deliberately refuse
to pay rent and find a federal court to delay eviction. When a celebrity can make headlines by avoid-
ing millions in debts by buying beachfront property in a fancy Florida resort, the whole bankruptcy
system suffers.").
140. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 182-83.
141. See infra Section IV (discussing who bears the costs of debt relief).
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those who can pay more should pay more. 142 Of course, what a debtor
can pay is equal to the income and assets that the debtor does not need
to support herself and thus depends on the standard of living that one is
willing to force a debtor to accept. 43 Fundamentally, the argument that
those with greater income and assets should pay more is based on the
theory that they do not need to enjoy a standard of living beyond the
reach of others. In this way, the objection to bankruptcy abuse is similar
to basic arguments of "fairness" that underlie much of the argument for
progressive taxation.'" This article does not quibble with the goal of eq-
uity in the taxation context; rather, it argues in Section III that the prin-
ciple does not readily apply to a system of debt relief.'45
B. Inequality and Incentives: A Limited Justification
As the literature on optimal taxation demonstrates, even if one
adopts the premise that all individuals should have an equal standard of
living, one may tolerate a substantial amount of inequality in order to
provide individuals with an incentive to engage in socially useful behav-
ior, such as working hard to generate the goods and services that we all
consume.1" Likewise, even if one believes that all defaulting debtors
should receive roughly the same standard of living, one may still tolerate
some degree of inequality in order to provide defaulting debtors with in-
centives to work hard or cooperate with the collections process. These
incentive arguments, however, are not as powerful as they would appear
(at least not in the context of debt relief), and thus one needs to search
further in order to justify the inequality of our debt relief laws.
1. Inequality and the Debtor's Incentive to Work
The analogy between the work incentives of the tax structure and
the work incentives of debt relief laws appears to be straightforward.
Assume, for the moment, that debt relief laws afforded all debtors the
same meager existence and required them to repay with anything they
earned in excess of this amount. Though Brian and Clara could earn
much more than this amount, they would have little, if any, incentive to
do so unless they could repay their debts in full. They would face an ef-
142. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 182 ("Debtors with good jobs and regular incomes
should be held to a different standard from debtors who confront real hardship or incapacity. Debtors
with higher incomes should ordinarily repay more to creditors than debtors with lower incomes.").
143. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 200 ("Where to draw the
line-how much sacrifice to require of people in debt-is a key question in bankruptcy.").
144. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 2, at 182 ("These principles are applied routinely by
government-higher-income earners are expected to pay more in taxes, just as needs-based relief is
the hallmark of most social welfare programs.") For a review of the literature on optimal progressive
taxation, see Stiglitz, supra note 18. The idea that those who can pay more should pay more also un-
derlies means-testing in social assistance, though in a slightly different form.
145. See infra Section III.
146. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 18 (reviewing the relevant literature).
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fective marginal tax rate of one hundred percent that would deprive
them of additional income earned by working harder. As a consequence,
they would likely choose to spend less time at work and more time with
their families or relaxing, and the collection system will yield little, if any-
thing, for creditors. Creditors may be able to induce Brian and Clara to
work more, and thus pay the creditors an additional amount, by allowing
them to keep some portion of their additional earnings.'47
This work-incentive argument is probably most directly applicable
in the context of garnishment law, but even there one can question the
argument. In advocating the greater use of garnishment in bankruptcy,
some commentators specifically cite the premise that debtors must be al-
lowed to retain some fraction of the additional earnings that come from
working harder so that they will retain some incentive to do so.148 This
does not mean that the disincentive to work will be completely elimi-
nated. Current federal limitations on garnishment allow general credi-
tors to seize up to twenty-five percent of a debtor's take-home pay,149 and
although some have called for bankruptcy garnishment rates that are ex-
ceedingly low, 5° such garnishment would seize at least a portion of the
last dollar a debtor earns. Because she will bear the full costs of working
the time necessary to earn this last dollar but will not receive the full re-
ward (some of the increased income will be garnished), the debtor may
choose to substitute toward more leisure; this is the "substitution" effect.
On the other hand, garnishment will make her less wealthy, and she may
choose to work more in order to finance her basic needs; this is the
"wealth" or "income" effect. Economists typically believe the substitu-
tion effect will dominate and lower tax rates will induce individuals to
work harder, 1' and, in any case, the income effect is irrelevant from the
standpoint of efficiency.152
147. This argument has obvious similarities to claims that reducing marginal income tax rates
would actually increase tax revenues. See, e.g., JOHN W. SLOAN, THE REAGAN EFFECT: ECONOMICS
AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 7 (1999) ("According to Supply Side Theory, reducing the rates for
all groups, and removing six million low-income families from the tax rolls, strengthened incentives to
work, save, and invest."). See generally LAWRENCE LINDSEY, THE GROWTH EXPERIMENT: How THE
NEW TAX POLICY Is TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990).
148. See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 269 ("Because the amounts required by the
guideline are a percentage of income and not dollar for dollar, the system would not discourage a
debtor from increasing productivity."); Wang & White, supra note 127, at 257. The statement by the
NBRC is plainly incorrect; any marginal tax rate greater than zero will affect the debtors incentive to
work. However, the NBRC suggested marginal rates so low (the highest rate of five percent would
apply only to those earning more than $75,000 per year) that the practical effect of their error may be
negligible.
149. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000) (restricting garnishment in favor
of general creditors to no more than the lesser of twenty-five percent of the debtor's "disposable earn-
ings" or the amount by which her disposable income exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage,
with "disposable earnings" defined in this context to mean roughly the debtor's take-home pay).
150. The NBRC recommended garnishment rates that would at most seize five percent of the
debtor's income. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 269.
151. When studying the effect of income taxation on the labor supply, economists refer to two
effects, the wealth (or income) effect and the substitution effect. The wealth effect refers to the ten-
dency of an individual to work more when a tax is increased because the tax makes her poorer and
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One can uncover the potential flaw in the claim that lower garnish-
ment rates will lead debtors to work harder by examining the analogy
that some scholars make between bankruptcy and public assistance pro-
grams. These bankruptcy scholars point out that public assistance can
provide recipients an incentive to work through a calibration of the bene-
fits-income relationship. If benefits are reduced by less than any increase
in income from new employment, then the recipient will have some in-
centive to seek that new employment.153 These scholars overlook a po-
tentially offsetting effect. This approach also invites others in poverty to
work a little less and thus qualify for public assistance, and one cannot
determine if the aggregate incentive to work increases or decreases unless
one compares the effects on each group.154
This potentially offsetting effect applies to garnishment as well, and
one cannot, as a matter of theory, conclude that a system that limits gar-
nishment provides greater incentives to work than a system that seizes all
of the debtor's wages above some meager amount. The more lenient sys-
tem may provide a greater incentive for a debtor to work after default.
By allowing the debtor to keep more of her wages after default, however,
the more lenient system will make default attractive to more debtors and
thus might cause some additional debtors to default. As long as the more
lenient garnishment system would seize some of the wages of the debtors
who would not have defaulted but for the leniency of the system, these
debtors would keep less of their marginal earnings than if they repaid
their debts in full and thus they would have less of an incentive to work
an additional hour. In addition, the more lenient system increases the
debtor's wealth and thus reduces her incentive to work. To determine
whether the more lenient system results in more hours worked, one must
compare the additional hours worked by the debtors who would default
under either system and the reduced hours worked by the debtors who
only default when garnishment is limited.
Although one may reasonably believe that, as an empirical matter,
limitations on garnishment do increase the aggregate incentive to work,
hence she values an additional dollar of income more highly and is willing to sacrifice more leisure to
get it. The substitution effect refers to the fact that the individual does not get to keep all of the last
dollar earned. The tax therefore makes leisure "cheaper" and the individual "substitutes" leisure for
work. Whether an increase in taxes will induce the worker to work more or less depends on which
effect dominates; however, economists generally believe that the substitution effect will dominate in
most circumstances. See, e.g., NEIL BRUCE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 428-32
(2d ed. 2001).
152. Id. at 430-31 (discussing inefficiency created by substitution effect).
153. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 116, at 471.
Today, even the crudest welfare proposal must leave the welfare recipient with some incentive to
earn the marginal dollar or the proposal has no hope of adoption. It is generally acknowledged
that if alimony and child support levels are set too high, they can be counterproductive by dis-
couraging the payer from earning more money. Yet under the scheme of Chapter 13, the debtor
who earns an additional dollar is required to pay that additional dollar to unsecured creditors.
Id.
154. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Economist's Lament: Public Assistance in America, 4 J. ECON.
PERSP. 57, 69 (1990).
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it is much more difficult to argue that the current inequality of Chapter
13 is designed to induce debtors to work harder. By its terms, Chapter 13
requires the debtor to repay with all of her projected disposable income
over three years.155 Some courts adopt a literal interpretation of this test
and require a debtor to repay an amount based on her projected income
rather than her actual income.156 Taken literally, the debtor's actual in-
come does not alter the amount that the debtor must repay: if she earns
more than her projected income, then she may retain the excess; and if
she earns less than her projected income, then she must somehow reduce
her living standards to meet the shortfall. 57 If this were the case, then
the projected disposable income test would create a lump-sum obligation
based on the debtor's ability to earn. A lump-sum tax based on an indi-
vidual's ability to earn represents the first-best, Utopian tax of the public
finance literature because the government can demand that the more
able pay greater taxes than the less able while still maintaining a tax sys-
tem that does not distort anyone's incentive to work.58 That is, the gov-
ernment can create a tax that is both fully equitable, because everyone
consumes the same amount,'59 and fully efficient because the marginal
tax on earnings is zero.16" Similarly, if courts could implement a system
that based a debtor's required repayment on her ability to earn, then
they could seek any measure of equality they desired without concern for
any adverse effects this would have on debtors' incentives to work.
1 61
Unfortunately, the first best taxation system described above is also
Utopian in that the government cannot observe an individual's ability to
earn and thus cannot implement the tax. 162 Because of this, the govern-
ment implements a tax based on something that it can observe: the indi-
vidual's actual income.' 6 Similarly, some judges doubt their ability to
project a debtor's income over the course of the plan, and therefore in-
terpret projected disposable income to capture the debtor's actual dis-
posable income over the course of the plan. 6 This creates an effective
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000).
156. See Anderson v. Satterlee, 21 F.3d 355, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1994).
157. See Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1
(2002).
158. See Stiglitz, supra note 18, at 995-96.
159. Additional technical assumptions are required to conclude that everyone would consume the
same amount in the Utopian system. For example, one could assume that the individual's enjoyment
of an additional dollar of consumption depends solely on her total consumption and not on the num-
ber of hours that she works. See, e.g., id.
160. Id. A lump-sum tax does not distort an individual's incentive to work because she must pay
the tax regardless of the actions that she takes; there is no substitution effect. A lump-sum tax may
cause an individual to work more by reducing her wealth, the income effect, but economists do not
focus on this effect because it does not affect the efficiency of the tax. See BRUCE, supra note 151, at
428-32.
161. See generally Hynes, supra note 157.
162. See Stiglitz, supra note 18, at 996-97.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Rowley v. Yarnall, 22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994) (interpreting "projected dispos-
able income" to mean "disposable income" for fear that debtor would "'predict' that disposable in-
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one hundred percent marginal tax rate, though occasionally courts re-
quire only that the debtor repay with some fraction, say fifty percent, of
her actual income above the projected amount.16 Even if a court inter-
prets "projected income" to really mean projected income instead of ac-
tual income, there is some chance that the court will later approve a re-
quest by the Chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor to modify the
plan to increase payments following an improvement in the debtor's cir-
cumstances,166 and a much greater chance that a court will approve a re-
quest by the debtor to modify the plan to reduce payments if her circum-
stances deteriorate. Because these modifications adjust the required
repayment based on the debtor's actual financial performance, they also
create an effective marginal tax on actual earnings and thus may discour-
age the debtor from working.
A bankruptcy policy that allows a more able individual to claim lar-
ger expenses in her initial plan 67 does nothing to reduce the effective
marginal tax on earnings, and thus does not increase the debtor's incen-
tive to work. Rather, such a scheme is more akin to income tax deduc-
tions that do not increase an individual's incentive to work because they
do not affect her marginal tax rate. In fact, these deductions may reduce
a debtor's incentive to work because they make the debtor more
wealthy.' 68
The incentive justification for the inequality of debt relief applies
even more poorly to the debtor's physical assets. Allowing the debtor to
come will be zero," and thus render the entire disposable income test meaningless); Hynes, supra note
157, at 55-75 (discussing case law).
165. In re Krull, 54 B.R. 375, 378 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). This approach was later followed in In
re Riggleman, 76 B.R. 111, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). However, the Southern District of Ohio has
since adopted the approach of Anderson. See In re Bass, 267 B.R. 812, 819 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001).
Note that this effectively creates a fifty percent marginal income tax rate on top of whatever other
taxes the debtor is paying.
166. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 21 F.3d 355, 358 (9th Cir. 1994) (basing its holding in part on the
ability of the trustee or unsecured creditor to request a modification of the plan to capture the benefit
of an unexpected improvement in the debtor's circumstances).
167. The same analysis does not apply to the adjustment of a debtor's expenses during subsequent
modifications. If the debtor knows that the court will allow her to claim additional expenses should
her earnings increase, then she will realize that the marginal tax on earnings will not be one hundred
percent. Economists noted this effect in welfare programs in that caseworkers typically adjusted ex-
penses upward when a recipient's earnings increased and thereby reduced the effective tax on earn-
ings. Burtless, supra note 154, at 63. Similarly, in the few cases where judges do increase a debtor's
required repayments following an increase in her earnings, they also increase her allowed expenses
and thereby reduce the effective marginal tax rate imposed by postconfirmation modifications. See
Hynes, supra note 157, at 33-36.
168. See generally BRUCE, supra note 151, at 432-33. Note that if the debtor cannot avoid the
debt obligation created in Chapter 13, then larger allowed expenses would not increase the debtor's
incentive to work even if the court demanded that the debtor repay with all of her actual income
above the allowed expenses. Assume that the judge determines that Brian should earn $90,000 a year
and spend $20,000. She would then demand that he use the remaining $70,000 per year to repay his
creditors. By assumption he cannot avoid the repayment of the $70,000 debt and therefore must work
hard enough to earn the $90,000 in order to consume the $20,000. If the judge raised the allowed ex-
penses to $40,000, then Brian would not work any harder. Again, he would work enough to earn
$90,000 so that he could consume $40,000.
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keep assets that she purchased with income earned after default may
provide her with some incentive to work. This argument has limited ap-
plicability to nonbankruptcy collection law because the debtor typically
shields assets purchased at an earlier time when she had more income.
This justification has no applicability to the exemptions of Chapter 7 be-
cause the debtor is given a discharge that allows her to spend her post-
bankruptcy earnings however she wishes.
169
2. Inequality and the Debtor's Incentive to Cooperate
Although the treatment of the debtor's assets cannot be explained
by the need to provide her with an incentive to work, perhaps it can be
explained by the need to encourage her to otherwise cooperate with the
collections process. In fact, this cooperation theory may have broader
application; a variant of this theory provided one of the earliest justifica-
tions for a discharge of debts in bankruptcy. 7' Under this theory, the
discharge of bankruptcy is offered as a carrot to those debtors who coop-
erate with the bankruptcy process and reveal the location of their assets,
so as to maximize the total distribution to creditors.7 '
The debtor cooperation theory never provided more than a partial
explanation for the discharge and has little meaning for the vast majority
of bankrupt debtors today. Keep in mind, one can encourage coopera-
tion either by using a carrot or a stick. Under ancient collection laws,
creditors could threaten a noncooperating debtor with enslavement or
even death,' 72 and as late as 1857, creditors in Massachusetts could have a
debtor imprisoned.1 73 Perhaps not coincidentally, it was not until well af-
ter debtor's prison was abolished in the United States that a lasting
Bankruptcy Act was passed. 74
Because the debtor cooperation theory posits that the discharge is
needed to maximize creditor collections, it provides a poor justification
for a modern bankruptcy system that yields nothing for unsecured credi-
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000).
170. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Con-
versions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 89-103 (1990) (discussing the
historical development of the justifications for the bankruptcy discharge).
171. Id. at 90.
172. Ancient Athens considered defaulting on a debt a capital crime. See, e.g., Lawrence H.
White, Bankruptcy As an Economic Intervention, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 281, 281 (1977). In ancient
Rome the creditors of a defaulting debtor could enslave the debtor or "divide the debtor's body into
proportionate shares." Id.
173. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935).
174. Id. at 52-92. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy
laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Prior to 1898, however, Congress enacted three bankruptcy acts
that together lasted less than twenty years. Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in 1803, 2
Stat. 248 (1803), the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in 1843, Act of March 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614 (1843), and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in 1878, Act of June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). Of course, state law did af-
ford early debtors some protection from their creditors even prior to the abolition of debtor's prison.
See generally PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISON-
MENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900 (1974).
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tors in approximately ninety-five percent of cases filed in Chapter 7.175
Bankruptcy may induce debtors to cooperate with foreclosure by their
secured creditors; however, secured creditors already enjoy substantial
rights under state law, and it appears that bankruptcy is likely to result in
the reaffirmation of a debtor's secured loans rather than foreclosure. 176
The debtor cooperation theory may have some applicability to
those few debtors who will repay a significant amount in bankruptcy be-
cause these debtors may be encouraged to reveal the location of their
most valuable assets. A system that provides potentially unlimited ex-
emptions in assets that are extremely hard to hide, such as the family
home, seems poorly designed for this goal. A system like the Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 that provides the debtor with exemptions equal to a percent-
age of the distributions to creditors would seem to provide her with a
much better incentive to cooperate. Indeed, scholars commonly argue
that the percentage exemption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was de-
signed to increase the returns to creditors. 17  The plausibility of this justi-
fication is undermined by the fact that the debtor was only allowed to re-
tain between three and ten percent of the assets that she handed over to
her creditors, up to a maximum of $800. I78 It is questionable, at best, to
assert than an effective asset tax of only ninety to ninety-seven percent
provides a strong incentive for the debtor to reveal her assets.
III. INEQUALITY, DEBT RELIEF LAWS, AND INSURANCE-THE BASIC
ARGUMENT
Most would probably agree that debt relief laws, like other laws,
must tolerate some degree of inequality, so as to encourage more able
debtors to cooperate with collection efforts by revealing the location of
assets or continuing to work hard to generate income. As demonstrated
175. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Bankruptcy Administration, Case Receipts Paid to Credi-
tors Professionals 1-2 (1994) (on file with the United States General Accounting Office, Washington,
D.C.) ("Of the 1.2 million Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases closed in statistical years 1991 and 1992, about
five percent (56,994) generated some receipts for distribution to professionals and creditors."). These
figures may overstate the repayment in Chapter 7, as most of the five percent of bankruptcies with as-
sets available for distribution to creditors are in fact business bankruptcies. See NBRC REPORT, supra
note 12, at 137.
176. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical
Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 713 (1999) (finding that twenty-five percent of cases
sampled had a reaffirmation agreement in the file); Warren, Principled Approach, supra note 11, at
499 (claiming that more than forty percent of debtors reaffirm some debt).
177. See, e.g., Shames, supra note 136, at 193-94; William J. Woodward Jr., Exemptions, Opting
out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 338 (1982).
178. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803). Though this amount representsjust $8,000 in year 2000 dollars, it was still a considerable sum at the time. By comparison, the average
daily wage for a laborer in Philadelphia in 1830 was just one dollar. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, His-
TORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 pt.1, at 163 (1975) (citing ser.
D 715-17: Average Daily Wage Rates of Artisans, Laborers, and Agricultural Workers, in the Philadel-
phia Area: 1785 to 1830).
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above,179 however, this incentive-based justification for the inequality of
debt relief cannot justify much of the inequality that characterizes our
current system.
To complete the defense of inequality, this article stresses a differ-
ent argument that suggests that the inequality of debt relief should not
merely be tolerated, but actively sought. This argument does not cele-
brate a world in which wealthy individuals, like Clara, can lead a lavish
lifestyle while others, like Adam, struggle to survive. Nor does this arti-
cle quibble with arguments for greater redistribution through taxation
and transfer programs; rather, this article posits that debt relief is ill-
suited to aid this effort.
The basic argument starts from the premise that if debt relief laws
are to serve any useful purpose, it is as insurance that individuals cannot
or will not purchase in the market due to well-recognized market fail-
ures. Debt relief, like any other insurance, provides a benefit, but comes
at a cost. Therefore, in the absence of market failure, different individu-
als would choose different levels of debt relief based on their wealth and
tolerance of risk. In particular, the wealthy would likely demand greater
protection than the middle class and the middle class would likely de-
mand greater protection than the poor. To demand that Adam, Brian,
and Clara receive the same standard of living after default would sen-
tence them all to a Procrustean system that would fit, at best, only one of
them well.
A. Debt Relief as Insurance
Debt relief laws present somewhat of a puzzle because they limit
enforcement of the monetary judgments that form the basis of much of
the American justice system.8 ° By forcing a tortfeasor to pay an amount
commensurate with the harm she causes, tort law gives her an incentive
to take precautions and provides some compensation to her victims. 1'
By forcing a party to pay damages upon breach of contract, contract law
protects exchange and encourages commerce.'82 To the extent that debt
relief renders tort and contract judgments unenforceable, debt relief de-
stroys these desirable incentives.
Scholars have devoted considerable effort to explaining why society
limits the ability of creditors to enforce a judgment against a debtor;
these works are effectively summarized elsewhere in the literature. 8' Of-
ten these arguments are divided into several distinct categories, such as:
(i) debtor cooperation, or the need to encourage the debtor to cooperate
179. See supra Section II.B.
180. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 214-15 (5th ed. 1998).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 130-44.
183. See generally Hallinan, supra note 20; Tabb, supra note 170, at 89-103 (reviewing the theories
in light of the willful and malicious exception to discharge).
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with collection efforts (discussed above); (ii) externalities, or the concern
that excessive debt collection will harm society by increasing the strain
on charity and the social welfare system or fomenting social unrest; (iii)
humanitarianism, or the need to restore the debtor's sense of self-worth
and thereby improve society as well; (iv) cognitive failure, or the pater-
nalistic concern that debtors will systematically make mistakes in their
financial decisions that will lead to their financial ruin; and (v) insurance,
or the theory that debt relief laws can help shift risk to parties who are
better able to bear it."8
With the possible exception of the debtor cooperation theory dis-
cussed in Section II, each of the other arguments can be integrated into
the insurance theory. For example, the externalities and cognitive failure
arguments are really just two sources of market failure that explain why
the government may wish to create debt relief laws offering insurance,
rather than leave individuals to purchase this insurance in private mar-
kets." The humanitarian argument is much more difficult to define, at
least in economic terms, but is clearly related to altruism, or an individ-
ual's concern for the well-being of her fellow citizens. This theory fails to
explain why society should be more concerned about individuals whose
destitution results from large obligations than individuals whose destitu-
tion results from a simple lack of assets.'86 As discussed below, the insur-
ance theory of bankruptcy provides one possible explanation."8
Scholars have long characterized debt relief laws as a form of insur-
ance."8 The standard insurance policy provides a benefit, often a cash
payment, to the consumer upon the occurrence of an insured event, such
as hospitalization, disability, death, or destruction of property.'89 In ex-
change, the insurer demands that the insured pay a premium that will, on
average, cover the benefits paid, any administrative costs and provide the
insurer with some profit. These premiums must also be large enough to
account for the moral hazards that insurance creates. Because the in-
surer will reimburse the consumer for some or all of her loss, the con-
sumer may fail to take the precautions necessary to reduce the risk or se-
verity of loss. In addition, the loss itself may be costly or difficult to
verify and the consumer will have an incentive to falsely claim or exag-
gerate a loss in order to obtain a larger benefit. These moral hazards will
increase the consumer's expected loss.
184. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 170, at 89-103.
185. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 20, at 109-25.
186. That is, it is difficult to argue that humanitarianism or altruism requires the more generous
treatment of the destitute that were formerly wealthy than the destitute that never enjoyed a higher
standard of living.
187. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (discussing the insurance theory of bank-
ruptcy).
188. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 20, at 98-109 (collecting citations and discussing the relation-
ship between bankruptcy and insurance).
189. Id. at 100-03.
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The consumer is willing to pay premiums that are, on average, in
excess of her expected loss in the absence of insurance because the insur-
ance contract reduces the uncertainty associated with her future standard
of living; risk-averse consumers are willing to sacrifice some wealth on
average in order to reduce uncertainty. The insurer is not as troubled by
the uncertainty because she will contract with many consumers, and, as
long as the risks associated with each are not highly correlated, will be
able to predict annual claims accurately.
190
Like insurance, debt relief laws provide a benefit to the debtor on
the occurrence of some contingency: the debtor's financial distress or
unwillingness to repay her debts.191 The benefit provided by this insur-
ance equals the debts the debtor is able to avoid paying. This benefit ef-
fectively increases the debtor's wealth and, as with other insurance bene-
fits, she can use this wealth to consume more, to retain assets of
particular value that she would otherwise have to sell, or to finance a
fresh start in business. Rather than charge premiums, the creditor will
charge the debtor a higher interest rate that reflects the increased prob-
ability of loss; however, the debtor and creditor may both benefit by
shifting the risk to the creditor if the creditor contracts with numerous
debtors and, thus, like an insurer, can diversify away much of the risk of
loss.
Rather than focus on the benefit provided by debt relief, this article
focuses on the standard of living that this benefit allows the debtor to
maintain. Consumers buy insurance to minimize large deviations in their
standard of living, and an ideal insurance policy would insure this stan-
dard of living directly."9 For example, an ideal health insurance policy
will pay the hospital bill, or at least the bill in excess of the deductible,
whether it is $100,000 or $1,000,000.
Most forms of insurance protect the debtor against a specific risk.
Yet, debt relief appears to protect the debtor against a decline in her fi-
nancial condition more generally. That is, debtors default after suffering
a variety of misfortunes including illness, unemployment, or divorce.'93
A great many of these debtors, however, still would not have found
themselves in financial distress had they exercised more prudence in
their financial affairs by saving for a rainy day or borrowing a little less, 94
and some debtors owe their financial distress solely to their own profli-
gate spending.1 95 But this does not really separate debt relief from other
insurance products because this behavior can be roughly characterized as
190. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 54 (2d ed.
1989).
191. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 20, at 98-109.
192. See id. at 102-03.
193. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 16-21.
194. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 8, at 1081 (describing the inability of consumers to withstand
shocks such as divorce or unemployment due to debt obligations they have incurred).
195. See, e.g., id. at 1087-88.
[Vol. 2004
NON-PROCRUSTEAN BANKRUPTCY
negligence, and, as a moment's reflection on automobile liability insur-
ance reveals, one can frequently insure against one's own negligence.196
Of course, bankruptcy may encourage the debtor to engage in risky be-
havior by shielding her from the consequences of failure,"9 but this is just
another example of the first type of moral hazard that insurance creates.
B. The Wealthy Insure a Higher Standard of Living
Because insurance is designed to minimize deviations from an indi-
vidual's expected or average standard of living, those who will, on aver-
age, have a higher standard of living will insure a higher minimum stan-
dard of living.98 Note that the effect of wealth on the level of insurance
is likely to be quite dramatic. By spending a few minutes on the Internet,
an individual can receive quotes for term life insurance that provides a
benefit anywhere between twenty-five thousand and twenty-five million
dollars.1" While other factors, such as the size of an individual's family
or her tolerance of risk, clearly play a role in the choice of insurance, one
196. Since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, Americans have been able to purchase
insurance against their negligent behavior. See, e.g., Breeden v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate
Glass Ins. Co., 119 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1909). By contrast, Americans generally may not purchase insur-
ance against intentional wrongs. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN L. WIlDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE
TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCrRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 5.4(a) (1988)
("Insurance policies typically include express provisions which either require that a loss be 'accidental'
or preclude coverage for intended results."); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord
over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct A
Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997, 47
AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1145-46 (1998) (describing the main components and clauses of a third-party
liability insurance contract); D. Heath Baily, Comment, Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington:
Resisting the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite Exclusion Clauses, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1645, 1645-46 (ex-
plaining how insurance companies protect themselves through the use of an intentional acts exclusion
clause). Indeed, policies that purport to insure against willful misconduct are generally void as against
public policy. See, e.g., Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. 1978); KEETON &
WIDISS, supra, § 5.4(d)(2). For the most part, bankruptcy law follows this logic and exempts debts
arising from many forms of willful misbehavior from the discharge of Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 523
(2000). Chapter 13, however, grants a broader discharge that absolves the debtor of liability for some
willful misbehavior, including willful and malicious torts. Id. § 1328.
197. Society may want to encourage the debtor to engage in risky behavior. For example, risk-
averse individuals may be reluctant to engage in entrepreneurial activity for fear that they will become
destitute after a business failure. Society may want to encourage such behavior because of the jobs
that this activity creates and may be able to do so by reducing the consequences of failure. See, e.g.,
John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 393, 399 (2000) (arguing that bankruptcy may encourage entrepreneurs to take risks). This expla-
nation for the bankruptcy system, however, must be combined with some form of market failure that
explains why the debtor cannot just purchase insurance against the risk of failure. In addition, this
explanation is more consistent with early bankruptcy laws that were restricted to merchants than mod-
em bankruptcy, which is dominated by consumers and others who don't owe their financial distress to
failed business ventures. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, 20 (1800) (repealed 1803).
198. The argument requires that the wealthy insure a greater minimum standard of living for
themselves, not that they purchase more insurance. It is possible that the very wealthy fail to purchase
insurance against risks that many would find significant because these risks cannot have an appreciable
impact on the wealthy's standard of living. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and
Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63,70 n.21 (1990).
199. See Instant Life Insurance Quotes, at http://www.quotesmith.com/cgi/term/qstermindex (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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can safely claim that wealthier individuals purchase more generous poli-
cies. Everyone would enjoy a life insurance policy that promised to pay
their families tens of millions of dollars should they die prematurely, but
these policies demand very large premiums. In the case of term life in-
surance for a thirty-five-year-old male without any unusual risk factors,
premiums on a twenty-five million dollar policy would be roughly five to
seven thousand dollars a year.2" These premiums would consume too
much disposable income for most families, and thus most families pur-
chase less generous policies, if any at all.
Casual perusal of the newspapers reveals stories of highly compen-
sated athletes or entertainers who purchase disability or life insurance
policies worth millions of dollars.2 1 For example, before the champion-
ship game in college football in January of 2003, the star running back for
the University of Miami purchased a two and a half million dollar policy
to protect himself against a career ending injury.0 2 The most lucrative
policies often name the employers of these celebrities as the beneficiar-
ies. 2°3 This is partly because these celebrities often have contracts that
guarantee payment in the event of injury;2° these celebrities are already
insured against these risks. But, of course, the insurance provided by the
guarantee comes at a price; the celebrity would have been able to negoti-
ate a higher salary if she did not receive the guarantee.
When viewed in light of the insurance purchased by the very rich,
their ability to "abuse" debt relief laws does not appear so patently of-
fensive. Even a million dollar homestead exemption provides a smaller
insurance benefit than that included in many of the policies that the very
wealthy enter into voluntarily, and no one would characterize these vol-
untary policies as abusive.
If one views debt relief as insurance, then it is also much easier to
defend the general inequality of debt relief. One could even defend laws
that effectively force the poor or middle class to repay even while
200. See id.
201. Steve Caulk, Olympians Find Insurance Costly; Athletes Safeguard Financial Future Against
Career-Ending Injuries, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 2, 2002, at 8S; Sally Roberts, Cards Covered If Big
Mac Is Stuck on the Sidelines, Bus. INS., Jan. 15, 2001, at 4.
202. See McGahee Will Declare for Draft Despite Injury, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at D2. As an
amateur, Mr. McGahee cannot be described as highly compensated. As a projected first-round draft
pick, however, he had a reasonable expectation of a lucrative career. In fact, even though injured, Mr.
McGahee was drafted, and he signed a contract on August 12, 2003, guaranteeing him seven million
dollars, and as much as fifteen million dollars over the next five years. John Wawrow, McGahee Signs
Deal with Bills, THE ANNISTON STAR, Aug. 15, 2003, available at http://www.annistonstar.comsports/
2003/as-pros-0813-0-3h12w5146.htm (last visited Jan. 19,2004).
203. See, e.g., Ken Rosenthal, Insurance Should Help Gonzalez Land Long-Term Deal, SPORTING
NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001.
204. For example, baseball's collective bargaining agreement requires that a club pay a player's
salary if he is injured in the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries
Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 247 (2000). The Screen Actors Guild Theatrical
Contract requires that producers obtain personal injury insurance for actors in the amount of
$1,000,000/$2,000,000. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, 2001 CONTRACT SUMMARY: THEATRICAL MOTION
PICTURES AND TELEVISION 13 (2001).
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wealthy deadbeats retain a higher standard of living. After default,
Adam might want the debt relief afforded Brian, and Brian might want
the debt relief afforded Clara. But the same would be true of any insur-
ance policy after an insured event. After some injury that leads to dis-
ability, Adam would want the insurance policy that affords generous
benefits to Brian, and Brian would want the insurance policy that affords
even more generous benefits to Clara. The relevant question is whether
Adam and Brian would have wanted a different insurance policy before
the insured event occurred. For example, though Clara might purchase a
term life insurance policy that provided the possibility of a multimillion
dollar benefit, Adam would not want that policy if he were made to pay
the premiums, as well. Therefore, a mandatory term-life insurance pol-
icy that applied to both Adam and Clara would either be too stingy for
one or too dear for the other. Likewise, unless one can find a way to
provide greater relief for the wealthy, one is likely to create a system of
debt relief that provides inadequate protection for the wealthy or results
in excessive interest rates for the poor.
IV. WHO PAYS FOR DEBT RELIEF
In arguing that the generous debt relief provided to the upper-
income or the wealthy is no more offensive than the generous insurance
policies purchased by the upper-income or the wealthy, the above analy-
sis presumes that, on average, the upper-income and the wealthy pay for
their own expected debt relief. This does not mean that the argument in
favor of generous treatment of the upper-income and the wealthy re-
quires that they pay higher interest rates than the poor; clearly they do
not.2"5 Rather, the upper-income and the wealthy must pay higher inter-
est rates than they would if they did not receive generous debt relief, and
the increased losses that creditors suffer as a result of the debt relief af-
forded to the rich must not affect the interest rates paid by the poor or
otherwise harm the rest of society. Therefore, the question of who pays
the costs of default is central to the analysis.
Because debt relief laws impair the ability of creditors to collect
their judgments, creditors bear the costs of debt relief ex post, at the time
of default.' For some creditors, such as tort victims, no further analysis
is needed because these creditors do not have an opportunity to charge a
price that reflects the risk of default. Thus, the retention of a multimil-
205. See, e.g., Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 217, 243 (1997) (finding that debtors with higher incomes paid lower interest rates).
206. Id. at 219 (arguing higher bankruptcy exemptions "reduce the amount that creditors receive
in repayment of debt").
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lion dollar home by an executive guilty of securities fraud2 7 comes at the
expense of those she was found to have wronged.2 °8
This article makes no attempt to defend these examples of abuse."
However, this article's restraint stems not from the amount of wealth re-
tained, but from the nature of the claim that remains unpaid. 20 This arti-
cle views debt relief as insurance, and therefore accepts the general
premise that insurance will not21 and cannot2 2 protect an individual from
the consequences of her intentional wrongs, and so it becomes equally
difficult to defend aspects of debt relief that protect the middle class or
even the poor from the consequences of intentional misbehavior. For
example, debtors have used the super-discharge of Chapter 13 to seek
protection from debts arising out of fraud,213 embezzlement,214 misappro-
priation,25 aggravated assault, 2 6 intentional shooting,2 7 sexual assault,
211
and the sexual abuse of a minor.21 '9 Although the proposed reforms limit
this super-discharge in cases that result in death or personal injury, the
ability to seek protection from the consequences of other forms of inten-
tional misconduct remains an anomaly.
For the most part, these involuntary creditors represent little more
than a sidebar in the debates over bankruptcy reform because the debts
207. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
208. Note that the legislation pending before Congress attempts to address this problem. The
proposed reforms restrict the homestead exemption for those liable for securities fraud to $125,000 per
debtor and limit the discharge for willful and malicious acts that result in bodily injury or death.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b)
(2002).
209. One might also question the treatment of tort claims based on a theory of negligence, how-
ever, this topic is left to another article.
210. The ability to use debt relief laws to avoid the repayment of tort creditors is obviously re-
lated to the extensive debate over the limited liability of corporations for torts. See, e.g., Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100
YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 n.1 (1991).
211. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 196, § 5.4(a) ("Insurance policies typically include express
provisions which either require that a loss be 'accidental' or preclude coverage for intended results.");
Rice, supra note 196, at 1146 (describing the main components and clauses of a third-party liability
insurance contract); Baily, supra note 196, at 1645-46 (1998) (explaining how insurance companies
protect themselves through the use of an intentional acts exclusion clause).
212. Contracts attempting to insure an individual against her intentional wrongs are typically
voided as against public policy. See, e.g., Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J.
1978); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 196, § 5.4(d)(2).
213. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 228 B.R. 19, 26 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); In re McBroom, 51 B.R.
953, 955 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985).
214. See, e.g., In re Nipper, 224 B.R. 756, 759 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998); In re Britt, 211 B.R. 74, 78
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
215. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 217, B.R. 273, 274 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997); In re Ledin, 179 B.R. 721, 725
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
216. See, e.g., In re Day, No. 98-3182 (7th Cir. 1999) (aggravated battery); In re Easley, 72 B.R.
948, 955 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987).
217. In re LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990).
218. See, e.g., In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995); Petty v. Belanger, 232 B.R. 543,
549 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Carsrud, 161 B.R. 246, 250 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1993).
219. See, e.g., In re Noreen, 974 F.2d 75, 78 (8th Cir. 1992).
220. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th
Cong. § 314(b) (2002).
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discharged in bankruptcy are overwhelmingly held by the consumer
credit industry and other creditors with claims arising in contract.221
Large commercial lenders like Citibank are unlikely to receive substan-
tial public sympathy, but one might still question the fairness of forcing
consumer lenders to effectively subsidize the lavish lifestyle of the upper-
income or the very wealthy.
In contrast with tort victims and other involuntary creditors, how-
ever, creditors who are in privity of contract with the debtor can adjust
their terms to reflect the possibility of debt relief and thus shift some of
the costs of debt relief to the debtor.2  That is, one cannot simply look
to the fact that the creditor remains unpaid; one needs to consider the ef-
fect that these laws will have on the supply and demand for credit.
Economists have long argued that because debt relief laws result in
losses for creditors, creditors will restrict the supply of credit by either
increasing interest rates or reducing access to credit.2' The empirical
evidence strongly supports this hypothesis.
224
Even if debt relief laws cause interest rates to rise, creditors may
still bear some of the cost of these laws depending on how the supply and
demand for credit reacts to changes in the effective interest rate. Note,
however, that it is not clear that debt relief laws represent a "cost" at all.
If debt relief laws solve some form of market failure and debtors realize
this, then these laws may increase the demand for credit by more than
the reduction in the supply of credit because the debtor will no longer
fear that default will result in impoverishment or worse.2" If so, the rele-
vant question is who captures the gains from these laws, not who bears
the costs. In fact, there is evidence that some debt relief laws have pro-
vided a net benefit to credit markets.226
221. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 303 (1989)
222. See, e.g., William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Autumn 1977).
223. See, e.g., id. at 23.
224. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., The Effects of Government Regulations on Personal Loan
Markets: A Tobit Estimation of a Microeconomic Model, 38 J. FIN. 1233 (1983); Gropp et al., supra
note 205; Daniel J. Villegas, Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation of the FTC's Credit Prac-
tice Rule, 42 J. ECON. & Bus. 51 (1990). Recently, however, some scholars have questioned whether
credit card interest rates are affected by defaults. See infra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Villegas, supra note 224. Beneficial laws do not necessarily result in an increase in
credit. See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 168 (2002).
226. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., Benefits and Costs of Legal Restrictions on Personal Loan
Markets, 29 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1986) (finding that statutes limiting deficiency judgments might provide
a net benefit, but that legal restrictions on confessions of judgment, garnishment, and security interests
in real property create a net cost); see also Villegas, supra note 224 (finding that restrictions on per-
sonal property and on wage garnishment provide a net benefit but that prohibitions on wage assign-
ment create a net cost). These articles test whether the laws provide a net benefit or a net cost by ex-
amining the effect on total borrowing; they argue that if the laws are desirable they should make
borrowing a more desirable product. This logic ignores the fact that one of the market failures justify-
ing government intervention is cognitive failure, which prevents consumers from accurately gauging
the value of these laws. See Hynes and Posner, supra note 225, at 187-88.
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Regardless, most economists would probably argue that the supply
of consumer credit is extremely responsive to the rate of return, and
therefore debtors will bear all of the costs of debt relief laws 227 or reap all
of the gain. If credit markets were not competitive, then one might ex-
pect lenders to bear some of the costs of debt relief because they would
be earning returns higher than they could earn elsewhere in the economy
and therefore would be reluctant to withdraw from the market if their re-
turn fell only slightly. The evidence suggests that credit markets are
highly competitive,22 and even if consumer lenders cannot themselves
profitably find other opportunities in response to a decline in their rates
of return, the individuals and institutions who supply them with capital
could readily move available funds to more lucrative opportunities. 229 It
is possible that the individuals and institutions supplying capital could
themselves bear some of the cost of debt relief laws if the laws reduced
the rate of return of capital generally,"0 but this effect will be muted by
the many uses of capital and the size of worldwide financial markets. 1
Of course, the relevant question for this article is which debtors
bear the cost of debt relief. Insurance spreads the cost of a single loss
across many insured parties through insurance premiums.232 Similarly,
debt relief spreads the cost of a single default across many debtors
through higher interest rates.233 However, the competitive nature of
lending markets ensures that these losses will only be spread across
debtors who present similar risks for a creditor. Because of this, scholars
have traditionally argued that debt relief laws are unlikely to shift wealth
between rich and poor debtors.234 Creditors have a strong incentive to
227. See, e.g., Meckling, supra note 222, at 23 ("For the reasons discussed above, all increases in
lending costs as perceived by lenders will in the long run be borne by potential borrowers.").
228. Credit markets may not be perfectly competitive; however, some consumer credit markets,
such as those for credit card debt or mortgages, are now truly national markets and it would be very
difficult to claim that any lender truly has market power. In addition, state and federal regulatory
structures work to prevent excessive concentration in local lending markets. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that different types of lenders, banks, finance companies, etc., compete for the con-
sumer's business. See, e.g., A. Charlene Sullivan, Competition in the Market for Consumer Loans, 36 J.
ECON. & Bus. 141 (1984).
229. See, e.g., Meckling, supra note 222, at 20.
230. See, e.g., J. Fred Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-51 (Autumn 1977).
231. The argument that lenders are unlikely to bear much of the cost of debt relief laws in the
long run may seem inconsistent with the consumer credit industry's recent lobbying efforts. But even
if creditors have nothing to gain in the long run from lobbying, they may have plenty to gain in the
short run from a change in the law. Even excluding home loans, FDIC insured commercial banks car-
ried approximately $688 billion in loans to individuals at the end of the third quarter of 2002. See Div.
OF INS. & RESEARCH, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE 4 (3d
Quarter, 2002), at http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2002sep/qbp.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). If a change in
law could even slightly increase their ability to collect these loans or even just shift losses to other
creditors, then it would be rational for them to spend millions of dollars lobbying.
232. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 20, at 136; William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer
Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047, 1080 ("The credit market is largely organized along
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screen debtors based on the probability that a debtor will repay, and the
debtors' assets and income are clearly relevant in this inquiry. Simply
put, high-income debtors and low-income debtors present relatively dif-
ferent risks and lenders will try to distinguish between them. As long as
the creditors collect sufficient information in a relatively inexpensive
credit application process that distinguishes between rich and poor debt-
ors, an increase in the probability of default by one type of debtor will
not affect the terms offered to the other. For example, assume that a
lender tries to charge Adam higher interest rates to compensate for some
change that increases the probability that Clara will default (but not the
probability that Adam will default). Another lender would simply offer
Adam credit at the old terms and the creditor would be unable to shift
the costs of Clara's generous expected debt relief to Adam.
Some might question whether the rapid growth of the credit card
industry undermines the above analysis.235 For example, the argument
that the wealthy bear the cost of their own debt relief assumes that credi-
tors can distinguish the wealthy from the poor when lending. However,
some scholars allege that credit card issuers fail to collect the basic in-
formation that would allow them to do so. 236
Some might even question whether, as a group, debtors bear the
costs of credit card losses. The traditional model alleges that competition
causes the terms of debt relief to be reflected in the interest rate, but
some scholars allege that credit card companies do not compete by offer-
ing lower interest rates. 237 According to this theory, credit card issuers do
not compete by offering lower interest rates because doing so will not at-
tract those debtors that are the most profitable: those that did not intend
to become indebted in the first place and thus do not pay attention to the
interest that the credit card companies charge. 8  If this allegation is
true,239 then a decline in defaults would not lead to lower interest rates
and debtors may not bear much of the costs of debt relief.2 °
class lines .... Consequently, any wealth redistribution is likely to be from good to bad credit risks, or
from cash to credit buyers, within the same general income class.").
235. Credit card loans still represent less than half of loans made to individuals by FDIC insured
institutions. At the end of the year 2000, commercial banks and savings institutions had approximately
$266 billion in credit card loans outstanding out of a total of approximately $402 billion in loans to in-
dividuals. Id. The amount of credit card loans has risen rapidly over time. In 1984, FDIC institutions
had just sixty-four billion dollars of credit card loans on their balance sheet, or approximately twenty
percent of their loans to individuals. Id.
236. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 137 ("The practices show
that credit card companies increasingly fail to ask for vital information, such as employment and in-
come, even at the start of the credit relationship.").
237. See Lawrence A. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50 (1991).
238. Id. at 70.
239. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 104-09
(2002).
240. Note that debtors may still bear some of the costs of debt relief through reduced access to
credit.
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This does not, however, necessarily mean that the creditors will
bear the cost of debt relief. Even if creditors do not compete by offering
lower interest rates, they may still compete on other grounds, such as
through annual fees, various reward programs, or better service.241  As
long as credit card markets may compete vigorously on these grounds,
they will not earn abnormal profits in the long run and will not bear the
costs of the debt relief laws.242
Of course, someone must bear the cost of credit card defaults. If
credit card issuers compete by offering lower annual fees, better service
or reward programs, then higher default rates could merely result in
credit card issuers offering less generous reward programs rather than
demanding higher interest rates. If this is the case, and if creditors are
unable to distinguish between those who use credit cards merely for con-
venience from those who use them as a source of borrowing, then debt
relief laws may effect a transfer from the former to the latter. The poten-
tial for a transfer between convenience users and borrowers is similar to
an earlier concern that credit losses would be borne by cash purchasers
of goods, as retailers who finance some purchases may respond to an in-
crease in defaults by raising prices for all consumers rather than by
merely charging a higher rate of interest to those who finance their pur-
chases or by offering a cash discount.243
Even if one believes that credit card losses could result in higher
costs for society generally or higher interest rates for the poor, this fact
would not offer a compelling justification for restricting the debt relief
offered to very wealthy debtors, like Clara, because the very wealthy
probably do not use credit cards as a significant source of their borrow-
ing.2" Occasionally one finds a wealthy debtor who has accumulated sig-
nificant credit card obligations, but these debts are generally small, rela-
241. See Zywicki, supra note 239, at 117.
242. One can extend Professor Ausubel's model to suggest that credit card issuers will fail to
compete on these other grounds, as well. According to Professor Ausubel, credit card terms are
"sticky" because the old terms may remain an equilibrium after a change in the cost of lending. See,
e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 527 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993). While Professor Ausubel focuses on the
interest rate, his model could apply to any other lending term. His model fails, however, to explain
why the lenders would choose the old lending terms from an infinite number of other possibilities that
also satisfy his equilibrium criteria.
243. See, e.g., Meckling, supra note 222, at 23-24.
244. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain good data on the debt holdings of the very wealthy.
According to the Survey of Consumer Finance, the percentage of families holding credit card balances
peaks at 52.8% for families with incomes in the fortieth to sixtieth percentile and then falls to 33.1%
for families with incomes in the top ten percent. See AIZCORBE ET AL., supra note 86, at 23. Accord-
ing to the Survey of Consumer Finance, the median income for families with incomes in the top ten
percent is $169,600. Id. at 5. Most individuals imagine households with incomes many times this
amount when they refer to the very wealthy. Because of their very large incomes and assets, the truly
wealthy need to incur a very substantial amount of debt in order to experience financial distress. Due
to the availability of less expensive sources of credit, it is somewhat implausible to believe that the
very wealthy incur millions of dollars of credit card debt.
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tive to the debtor's other obligations.245 Perhaps more telling is the fact
that some credit card companies actually opposed efforts to cap exemp-
tions.246 Simply put, the credit card industry did not consider the unlim-
ited exemptions sufficiently important to them and wanted to avoid any
reforms that could generate opposition from politicians from states, such
as Texas, that had these exemptions.247 By contrast, if one posits that
credit card debt is primarily a middle-class phenomenon 2' and that credit
card issuers do very little to distinguish between debtors based on their
incomes, then it is at least plausible that affording upper-middle-class
debtors like Brian 249 a generous fresh start will raise borrowing costs for
the poor or the less affluent members of the middle class.
V. CONSIDERING THE SOURCE OF MARKET FAILURE
To explain why society adopts debt relief laws, one must do more
than argue that these laws insure debtors against risks; one must also ex-
plain why consumers cannot, or will not, buy such insurance in private
markets. In fact, private markets do provide insurance against many of
the same risks that are commonly cited as leading to financial distress
and default. For example, while illness and disability are frequently cited
as circumstances leading to bankruptcy,25° many consumers purchase
health insurance or disability insurance in private markets. In addition,
one can buy insurance that provides a much closer substitute for debt re-
lief: credit insurance. Credit insurance, like bankruptcy, relieves the
debtor of the obligation to repay her debt after the debtor has suffered
some misfortune, such as unemployment or disability."
Because well-functioning markets produce efficient outcomes, an
argument that debtor-creditor law must provide insurance or a "fresh
start" to the debtor rests on some theory of market failure. Many stan-
dard forms of market failure, such as imperfect competition, have limited
245. An anecdotal survey of newspaper reports on bankrupt celebrities reveals that credit cards
do not comprise the primary portion of the debts that drove them into bankruptcy. See, e.g., Ka-
logerakis et al., supra note 30.
246. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 9, at A6 ("Texans also found allies in credit card company lob-
byists who worked against a tough limitation [on homestead exemptions] on grounds that such a pro-
vision would turn Texas and Florida legislators against the bankruptcy bill and doom chances for re-
form.").
247. Id.
248. See, e. g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 110.
249. Brian's income may place him beyond what many would consider middle-class. However,
the term "middle-class" is not well defined and can be applied to most Americans. See, e.g., id. at 28
("The most important point to make about the American middle class is that most Americans believe
that they are in it.").
250. Id.
251. See CONSUMER CREDIT INS. ASS'N, THE 2000 FACT BOOK OF CREDIT-RELATED INSURANCE
4 (2000). Consumer advocacy groups have been highly critical of credit insurance. See, e.g., CONSUM-
ERS UNION & THE CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT INSURANCE: THE $2 BILLION A YEAR RIP-OFF
(1999), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/credit.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter CREDIT INSURANCE RIP-OFF].
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
application to credit markets.5 2 Although insurance creates moral haz-
ards by giving the insured an incentive to seek compensation when she
has not in fact suffered a loss and reducing her incentive to take precau-
tions, these moral hazards do not justify government intervention be-
cause there is little reason to believe that the government will be more
effective than the market at solving these problems.2 3 However, scholars
have identified several other forms of market failure that could justify
government intervention.2 4 Some of these failures may support the ine-
quality of debt relief while others clearly do not. Therefore, one must
determine the market failure that debt relief laws are designed to solve.
A. Externalities and the Sufficiency of Stingy Debt Relief
Debtors will overborrow or fail to purchase the correct amount of
insurance if their financial failure creates externalities, i.e. if their finan-
cial failure affects individuals who are not party to the credit transaction.
Self-interested debtors will not consider the effect that their decisions
have on these third parties and will purchase only the insurance that is in
their own interest, not the greater amount of insurance that is in society's
interest. Early justifications for debt relief laws tended to focus on the
harm that severe collections efforts have on the debtor's family, rather
than on the debtor herself." Essentially, this argument held that fami-
lies must be protected from the improvident borrowing decisions of hus-
bands and fathers who fail to account for the needs of their dependents.
More commonly, scholars argue that credit creates externalities for
society as a whole. Some commentators argue that severe collections
laws could lead to a large class of destitute individuals and foment social
unrest. 6 Others cite an externality stemming from society's altruistic na-
ture.257 Because the altruist is saddened when she observes her fellow
citizens in poverty, she will be harmed by overly aggressive collections
laws that leave her neighbor destitute. Because the debtor does not con-
sider this harm to the altruist when borrowing, she may borrow too much
or fail to purchase sufficient insurance.
Of course, society can use government transfers to alleviate the
debtor's poverty,2 8 but this may create a "Samaritan's dilemma." 9 Be-
252. See supra note 228 (discussing evidence that credit markets are highly competitive).
253. See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Arm Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22
ECON. INQUIRY 188, 189 (1984).
254. See infra notes 258-62,270-71,276-78, 282-84, 308 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 173, at 62-89; Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in
Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1419 (1985).
256. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 260 ("[Clonsumer bank-
ruptcy provides critical relief that heads off social unrest and keeps the maximum number of players in
the economic game."); Hallinan, supra note 20, at 117-21.
257. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 255, at 1420-24.
258. The individual could also alleviate this poverty through charitable donations; however, each
individual would prefer that her neighbor make the necessary contributions as poverty relief is essen-
tially a public good. See, e.g., Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribu-
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cause the debtor and creditor know that the social assistance program ex-
ists, they know that society will supplement the debtor's income when
she becomes impoverished. The creditor may be more eager to lend be-
cause she hopes to collect from these government transfers. The debtor
may fail to take precautions, such as the purchase of insurance, 260 that
protect her against loss and may engage in behavior, such as excessive
borrowing, that makes her impoverishment more likely. 61
A closely related problem is created by the possibility that strong
collections laws may discourage a defaulting debtor from working.
There are really two effects here. If the creditor garnishes the debtor's
wages or otherwise lays claim to a fixed percentage of the debtor's future
income, then the creditor may reduce the debtor's incentive to work.262
This marginal effect is, however, probably not that important. First, as
noted above, it is not clear that reducing the percentage of earnings that
a creditor can garnish will increase the aggregate incentive to work.263
Second, it is not at all clear that this effect creates an externality, as one
must explain why the debtor's reduced efforts do not merely result in a
loss of earnings. One could find an externality if the debtor's reduced ef-
forts reduced the productivity of other workers.26  Although this may
well be true, this problem is not unique to debt collection and is found in
income taxation, as well.265 In fact, when measured by historical marginal
tax rates, the effective marginal tax created by modern garnishment is ac-
tually fairly low. Consider, for example, a single debtor living in Virginia
and earning $25,000 a year. This debtor has a marginal tax rate of ap-
proximately 25.7% once all state and federal taxes are considered. 21 If
her wages are garnished, then the total effective marginal rate will rise to
approximately 44% .267 Although this rate is quite high, it is only slightly
higher than the marginal rate of 43% that she would pay without gar-
tion, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 542, 543 (1969). In any case, private charity would suffer from the same Sa-
maritan's dilemma.
259. See, e.g., Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma and Government Transfer Pol-
icy, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 46 (1995) (explaining the "Samaritan's Dilemma," wherein the poor fail to
take precautions against loss in anticipation of government transfers from the wealthy).
260. See, e.g., id. at 50-51.
261. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 66, at 243-48; Jackson, supra note 255, at 1402; Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Re-
lated Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
262. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
264. See Stiglitz, supra note 18, at 1019-21 (discussing this assumption in optimal tax literature).
265. Id.
266. This assumes that the individual must pay 7.65% in Social Security and Medicare, five per-
cent in Virginia state taxes, and fifteen percent in federal taxes on the amount remaining after the
other taxes are assessed.
267. Garnishment would seize an additional twenty-five percent of the debtor's after-tax income.
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nishment if she earned $300,000 per year" and well below some histori-
cal federal tax rates, which reached as high as 94% in 1944-1945.269
More serious is the possibility that collection efforts become so on-
erous that the debtor will forego work altogether and instead rely on so-
cial assistance or work in the cash economy. 20 This problem, sometimes
referred to as the "debt overhang, "271 creates an externality because the
debtor foregoes productive labor and either becomes a drain on the pub-
lic fisc or ceases to contribute to such fisc through taxation.
Both the Samaritan's dilemma and the debt overhang may justify
debt relief, but they cannot plausibly justify the debt relief currently of-
fered to the wealthy or even the upper-middle class. To solve the debt
overhang, society need only ensure that the debtor will always prefer
working in the market sector to relying entirely on government transfers
or nonmarket income.272 To do so, debt relief laws may have to forgive
all of Adam's debts without demanding any repayment. But it strains
credibility to argue that Clara or Brian must be allowed to retain all of
their future income or else they will choose to rely on public assistance or
work at a job that pays them a fairly small cash income; public assistance
is simply not that generous 3.2  For example, in Virginia the maximum
weekly unemployment insurance benefit is just $368.274 Even allowing
for the possibility that Brian would prefer more leisure time, it is unlikely
that he would leave his job and his approximately $1730 weekly salary
and rely on unemployment insurance if he is asked to repay some
amount out of future income through a process such as Chapter 13.275
268. This assumes that the individual must pay five percent in Virginia state taxes and 39.7% in
federal taxes on the amount remaining after the state taxes are assessed. This individual would face no
marginal Social Security or Medicare taxes because she will have exceeded the maximum taxes.
269. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATE AND THE PRESIDENT'S INDIVIDUAL IN-
COME TAX RATE PROPOSALS 7-8 tbl.1 (2001), at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-6-01.pdf (last visited Jan.
19,2004).
270. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 66, at 228-48; Hallinan, supra note 20, at 120-25.
271. For an explanation of debt overhang, see David G. Carlson & Jack F. Williams, The Truth
About the New Valve Exception to Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1303,
1317 (2000); Alan Schwartz, Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Theory: The
Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1218-20 (1994). For
examples in personal bankruptcy, see Evelyn Brody, Paying Back Your Country Through Income:
Contingent Student Loans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449,506 (1994).
272. Some wealthy debtors with substantial unearned income in the form of pensions may choose
not to work. One cannot use the availability of these pensions to justify a generous discharge for the
wealthy unless one has an explanation for why these pensions must be exempt.
273. David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987) (review-
ing JACKSON, supra note 66).
274. Econ. Policy Inst., Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) Calculator, at http://www.epinet.org/
content.cfm/datazone-uicalcjindex (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
275. If Brian voluntarily left his job, then he would not receive any unemployment insurance, but
would instead have to rely on other forms of social assistance. See, e.g., Gilian Lester, Unemployment
Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 350 (2001). Unfortunately for him, Brian
may be ineligible for other forms of social assistance. See Carlson, supra note 273, at 1374 ("In the
United States, federally funded welfare programs are limited to the aged, blind, disabled, or single
parents with dependent children.").
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B. Market Failures That Support Mandatory but Unequal Debt Relief
The externality argument posits that debtors do not buy the insur-
ance that is in society's interest. In order to invoke the basic insurance
theory of inequality outlined in Section III, one needs to find market
failures suggesting that the debtor does not buy the insurance that is in
her own best interest. The standard theories that support such a proposi-
tion are paternalism and adverse selection.
1. Cognitive Failure and Paternalism
A consumer may over-borrow27 6 or fail to negotiate for enough in-
surance if she suffers from one of a host of cognitive failures. 77 If so, the
government may improve the consumer's welfare by forcing her to pur-
chase the insurance that she would have purchased had she only known
better. One might believe that the rate of cognitive failure should fall
with education, but some scholars argue that members of the middle
class remain quite susceptible to these cognitive failures.278 If the latter
position is true, and if the debt relief afforded the middle class or upper-
middle class does not adversely impact those of lesser means through
higher interest rates or reduced access to credit, 79 then the government
should allow upper-middle-class debtors to maintain a higher standard of
living than the poor following default because by doing so the govern-
ment is just forcing the upper-middle class to purchase the greater pro-
tection that they would have demanded had they only known better.
That is, unlike the externality arguments discussed above, paternalism
may provide a justification for debt relief laws that allow middle-class or
upper-middle-class debtors like Brian to maintain a sharply higher stan-
dard of living than the less fortunate members of society like Adam.
Once one concludes that paternalism requires the government to
enact debt relief laws allowing Brian to maintain a higher standard of liv-
ing than Adam, it is difficult to argue that Clara does not deserve a
higher standard of living than Brian. Just as Brian would demand
greater protection than Adam if each thought clearly about the risks in-
volved, Clara would demand greater protection than Brian if each
thought clearly about the risks involved. One would, therefore, need to
explain why the very rich are smarter or more disciplined than the rest of
us in order to explain why debt relief should not afford them a higher
standard of living after default. In light of the chronicles of celebrity
276. Of course, many of the cognitive failures that allegedly afflict consumers may also cause
them to borrow too little if they underestimate the value of the debt relief that they will receive upon
default. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Bankruptcy Policy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 127.
277. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 66, at 237-41; Hallinan, supra note 20, at 113-17.
278. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 140 ("Some people cannot
manage credit... [and] [tlhe availability of consumer debt has forged a crack in middle-class economic
stability.").
279. See supra Section IV.
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bankruptcies that fill the newspapers,2s this may be difficult to do. In
fact, if one believes that some individuals suffer from an inability to
manage their money, then it is particularly difficult to argue against some
asset protection tools used by the rich to solve this very problem, such as
spendthrift trusts.281
Of course, one may argue that Clara simply does not need to retain
a life of luxury financed by a generous spendthrift trust in order to pro-
tect her against her own misspending. After all, if she lost these assets
after default, perhaps she would take more care. Luxury, like beauty, is
in the eye of the beholder. Brian would consider Clara's lifestyle luxuri-
ous because she has far greater assets and income than he does. If
viewed from the perspective of Adam, then Brian lives a life of luxury as
well. One needs a reason to adopt Brian's, and not Adam's, definition of
luxury.
2. Adverse Selection
Economists sometimes justify mandatory insurance programs as a
solution to asymmetric information, or the possibility that consumers
have much greater information about their own risk of injury than do
their potential insurers 82 If this is the case, then insurers may refuse to
offer any insurance for fear that there will be adverse selection, that only
those consumers with a particularly high probability of injury will ap-
ply. 83 Insurers may be able to offer some insurance if the low-risk indi-
viduals can find some signal to distinguish themselves. In order for this
signal to be credible, it must be costly. This adverse selection can lead to
a market in which the good individuals are insured at a low rate, but
would prefer to forego the costs of the signal and accept the higher pre-
miums associated with the average risk in society.2"
These same basic issues of adverse selection are present in credit
markets. If creditors cannot cheaply distinguish between debtors with a
high probability of default and those with a low probability of default,
then low-risk consumers may try to signal their type by agreeing to ex-
cessively harsh or even punitive collections methods.2" These harsh col-
lection methods serve as an effective signal because high-risk debtors
280. See Kalogerakis et al., supra note 30.
281. For a discussion of spendthrift trusts, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Pol-
icy: Economics and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995).
282. For a discussion of asymmetric information in the context of consumer finance, see, for ex-
ample, Hynes & Posner, supra note 225, at 173-77.
283. See, e.g., Nicholas Barr, Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation,
30 J. ECON. Lrr. 741, 750-52 (1992) (discussing adverse selection in the context of social insurance pro-
grams). The seminal paper on this topic is George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality,
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (demonstrating the fundamental
problem of adverse selection by using the used car market as an example).
284. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 283, at 750-52.
285. See, e.g., Rea, supra note 253, at 196-99.
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would find these terms more costly, due to their higher probability of de-
fault. A rule banning such harsh terms may improve aggregate social
welfare; the higher interest rates paid by the low-risk consumers once the
punitive collection methods are banned will roughly offset the lower in-
terest rates paid by the high-risk consumers, and society will not need to
endure the costs of the punitive collection methods. In fact, it is possible
that the low-risk consumers themselves would prefer the new credit con-
tract without harsh collections terms and with an interest rate that re-
flects the average probability of default in society. Such a contract was
not offered prior to the ban on harsh collections terms because lenders
believed that consumers who refuse to agree to such terms were high-
risk; this belief was confirmed in equilibrium.286 Unfortunately, a rule
banning harsh collections tactics will not necessarily improve welfare. If
there are enough high-risk debtors in the marketplace, then asymmetric
information could lead to credit rationing or cause credit markets to col-
lapse entirely.287
Although asymmetric information may imply that similarly situated
debtors should receive the same treatment after default, this does not
mean that Adam, Brian, and Clara must all maintain the same standard
of living because creditors can, at very low cost, distinguish between
them at the time of lending and thus there is no adverse selection. The
adverse selection argument posits a market in which there are groups of
debtors that appear identical to our three debtors but have different
probabilities of default. For example, assume that there are three more
debtors, Alan, Ryan, and Clarice, who have the same relevant observable
characteristics (occupation, income, assets, etc.) as Adam, Brian, and
Clara, respectively. The adverse selection argument demands that Brian
and Ryan receive similar treatment after default, but that each receive
more generous treatment than Alan and Adam because creditors can
cheaply distinguish between Adam and Brian (or Alan and Ryan).
Therefore, like the paternalism argument, the adverse selection argu-
ment implies that debt relief laws should allow Clara to maintain a sub-
stantially higher standard of living than Brian and Brian to maintain a
substantially higher standard of living than Adam following default, be-
cause adverse selection prevents each from purchasing the insurance that
is in her or her self-interest.
286. See, e.g., Phillippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts
Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381,388-92 (1990). The analysis of Aghion & Hermalin
is actually more complicated and relies on a modeling assumption known as the "intuitive criterion."
Id. at 387. Note further that Aghion & Hermalin's argument assumes that the low-risk individual can-
not switch to another, unregulated, signal.
287. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect In-
formation, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1981).
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3. Limits of the Argument
The paternalism and adverse selection arguments justify a system
that affords greater protection to upper-income or wealthy Americans.
This does not mean, however, that they support the degree of inequality
created by the current debt relief laws. Take, for example, the Chapter 7
discharge that protects all of a debtor's future income.2" This protection
allows Clara to support a lifestyle after default commensurate with a
$1,000,000 income, but allows Adam to support a lifestyle commensurate
with an income of just $10,300. Even if one accepts that Clara would
demand a higher standard of living than Adam, one does not have to ac-
cept that she would have bargained for this level of protection.
One could, for example, believe that a more appropriate system
would allow Clara to keep some portion of her additional income and
adopt a system of progressive garnishment that has been proposed by the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and by prominent scholars.289
But note that such a system provides imperfect insurance because it sets
the debtor's consumption with reference to her current earnings rather
than her expected earnings. This distinction is important because the
misfortune that forces a debtor into financial distress varies considera-
bly. 290
For example, assume that there are two debtors, a low-wage debtor
and a high-wage debtor who earns twice the salary of the low-wage
debtor. Assuming that these debtors are otherwise equal, the insurance
theory of bankruptcy suggests that the high-wage debtor deserves a
higher standard of living after default than the low-wage debtor.29' As-
sume that each suffers an illness and that although the high-wage
debtor's health insurance covers the costs of her treatment, the illness
leaves her unable to perform her old job and forces her to accept a posi-
tion at the same salary as the low-wage worker. The high-wage worker's
financial distress results from debts that become unmanageable due to
the fall in her wage. By contrast, assume that the low-wage debtor suf-
fers no change in employment or earnings, but her health insurance does
not cover the full costs of her treatment and her distress results from
these medical bills. The insurance theory of debt relief would have af-
forded the high-wage worker a higher standard of living than the low-
wage worker, but a system of garnishment would equalize their lifestyles.
288. Chapter 7 discharges all of a consumer's debt with the exception of narrowly defined nondis-
chargeable debts and debts voluntarily reaffirmed by the consumer. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000). This dis-
charge serves as an injunction against future collections efforts, id. at § 524(a), and thus prevents the
debtor's pre-petition creditors from making a claim on her post-petition income.
289. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. To be clear, the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission did not advocate the abolition of Chapter 7, but merely the replacement of Chapter
13 with a system of progressive garnishment. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 270-72.
290. See supra note 193.
291. See supra Section III.B.
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Perhaps the current form of Chapter 13 and its reliance on the
vague "reasonably necessary" standard provides an alternative. Assume
that, as critics probably allege correctly, a debtor's reasonably necessary
expenses are positively correlated with the debtor's prebankruptcy ex-
penses or "station in life. ' 292 If individuals set their living expenses at a
level appropriate for their expected earnings, then the fact that a debtor's
expenses in bankruptcy are positively related to her prebankruptcy ex-
penses may in fact be desirable, because this would mean that they are
positively related to the debtor's expected earnings.
Unfortunately, one of the primary justifications for debt relief laws
is that consumers are not always rational, 93 and many debtors arrive in
bankruptcy precisely because their standard of living was not commensu-
rate with their expected earnings. Additionally, this use of the debtor's
standard of living invites abuse in that the debtor has a strong incentive
to accumulate consumer durables and increase her expenses prior to fil-
ing for bankruptcy.294 If courts are unable, or unwilling, to stop this prac-
tice, then the debtor's prebankruptcy expenses will serve as a very poor
proxy for the insurance that she would have purchased in the absence of
market failure.
The proposed bankruptcy reforms attempt to limit the ability of a
debtor to inflate expenses by providing a more elaborate definition of
the reasonably necessary standard and by setting a significant portion of
the expenses of debtors with income above the median with reference to
certain schedules published by the Internal Revenue Service.295  The
meagerness of these expenses is well-documented, and even the pending
legislation appears to contemplate revision by the Internal Revenue
Code to more accurately reflect a reasonable cost of living."9
More interesting from the standpoint of this article is that a signifi-
cant portion of the debtor's allowed expenses explicitly increase with the
debtor's past income,27 a fact criticized by some scholars.298 Those debt-
ors who had a higher average income over the preceding six months
would be entitled to greater living expenses in bankruptcy. If one is con-
cerned about manipulation, then the debtor's past earnings may be a
much better predictor of the insurance that she would have purchased
than the debtor's living expenses. Of course, the effect of this is not
dramatic, and increased earnings beyond approximately $70,000 per year
292. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 116, at 478-82.
293. See supra Section V.B.1.
294. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 116, at 472-73.
295. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
296. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th
Cong. § 103 (2002).
297. Id.
298. See Tabb, supra note 7, at 24.
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no longer increases allowed expenses.299 As discussed in Section VI, this
brings bankruptcy roughly in line with other systems of social insurance.
C. Costly Contracting and Default Rules
To solve each of the above market failures, the government must
adopt mandatory debt relief laws that debtors cannot contract around in
a cost-effective manner. Selfish consumers would gladly waive their right
to use a debt relief law in exchange for a lower interest rate if the cost of
this waiver would be borne largely by third parties. Cognitively chal-
lenged consumers might also waive the debt relief laws in exchange for a
lower interest rate if they fail to recognize the value of debt relief.'° If
debtors are able to contract around the debt relief laws, then they may
still effectively signal their risk of default, leaving the problems adverse
selection creates.
Debtors may be able to contract around some forms of debt relief,
particularly those most often cited as subject to abuse by the very
wealthy. Though the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety may protect an
unlimited amount of home equity,3' it will only do so if the married cou-
ple includes the necessary terms in their deed and did not co-sign their
loan. Spendthrift trusts and corporations will only protect debtors who
have created these entities and utilized them in the correct manner.
Some states only allow a debtor to claim a homestead exemption if she
files a declaration prior to borrowing.3° Many other states once allowed
a debtor to waive property exemptions. 3 Although such waivers are no
longer effective,"° debtors may be able to effectively waive some of the
more generous exemptions, such as those in the home or in retirement
assets, 3'5 by granting security interests in the exempt assets.3°
299. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
300. Forcing these debtors to take an affirmative step to waive the use of these laws may serve a
useful role in forcing them to consider the value of what they are foregoing. In this manner, waiveable
laws may act in a way similar to laws with a mandatory cooling off period. See, e.g., Howard Beales et
al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981).
301. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 2 (2000) (restricting homestead exemptions to those
who have declared their real property a homestead in the deed of conveyance or a subsequent filing
with the county or district in which the property is situated).
303. See, e.g., James B. Haines, Jr., Security Interests in Exempt Personalty: Toward Safeguarding
Basic Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215,222-30 (1981).
304. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(2) (2002).
305. Though the recent bankruptcy reforms significantly expanded the ability of a debtor to ex-
empt retirement savings, these additional exemptions will not apply if the debtor voluntarily borrows
against these assets. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
306. Federal law limits the ability of creditors to take nonpurchase money security interests in the
debtor's household goods. See supra notes 39-62 and accompanying text. This approach is consistent
with the externality argument for debt relief. Society will suffer a clear harm if the individual does not
retain the tools or clothes he needs to work and thus becomes a drain on the public fisc. Arguing that
a wealthy debtor must retain her mansion or else society will suffer a negative externality is far less
compelling.
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To the extent that debtors can waive these protections, they become
mere default rules; but default rules can play a useful role if contracting
is costly. Some argue that the costs of creating debt relief terms would
not be very large," 7 but the experience of credit insurance indicates oth-
erwise.3"8 The loss ratio on credit insurance is dramatically lower than
that of other insurance products. For example, approximately ninety
percent of group life insurance premiums and seventy-five percent of
group accident and health insurance premiums are paid out as claims.3"
By contrast, the loss ratio on credit insurance averaged just thirty-nine
percent and sometimes was far lower.3"' In the year 1997, the loss ratio
on credit unemployment insurance in South Dakota was just 3.6%. 3"
These low loss ratios do not necessarily translate into profits for in-
surers because lenders charge very large commissions when they help
write the insurance policy. In 1997, commissions on credit unemploy-
ment insurance averaged 52.6% of premiums.312 Though these high pre-
miums and commissions may result from some sort of cognitive failure
that causes debtors to over-pay for credit insurance,313 these high com-
missions may also suggest that it is extremely costly to negotiate and
write these contracts.
If the debtor and creditor are unable to negotiate effectively, then
the government may be able to improve on the market solution by set-
ting a default rule that serves as a reasonable estimate of what many
debtors would desire and enables other debtors to cheaply contract
around these rules. A system of generous exemptions could plausibly
match this description if debtors would demand very generous debt relief
in a well-functioning market. As long as the exemptions are tied to spe-
cific assets that are unlikely to change frequently, such as the debtor's
home, debtors and creditors may be able to cheaply contract around the
exemptions by using mortgages.
307. See, e.g., Rea, supra note 253, at 189. According to this argument, while it would be very
costly for a debtor to negotiate the terms of this insurance with each and every lender, the costs of
choosing the insurance could be greatly reduced by standard form contracts; creditors could compete
by offering loan agreements with some combination of interest rates and loan forgiveness terms just as
mortgage lenders now compete by offering loans with some combination of an interest rate and origi-
nation fees. Consumers could obtain roughly their desired amount of protection by searching for the
right contract in the market.
308. See CREDtT INSURANCE RIP-oFF, supra note 251, at 2.
309. See id. The authors themselves cite Best's Aggregates and Averages.
310. Id. at 3.
311. Id. at 8.
312. Id. at 3.
313. Critics of credit insurance set forth other theories to explain the high commissions. For ex-
ample, one common complaint is that credit insurance markets exhibit "reverse competition" in that
insurance companies are forced to offer high commissions to encourage lenders to carry their product
and thus must charge high rates to the ultimate consumer. Id. at 11. Of course, this explanation is in-
complete as it would seemingly apply to every transaction in which an insurer relied on brokers to sell
its product. Ultimately, these stories rely on some sort of cognitive or information failure to explain
why the distribution system does not work in this context.
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If one accepts the premise that some debt relief laws serve as default
rules, then one can invoke a much more palatable argument in favor of
inequality. The wealthy and the upper-middle class deserve to maintain
a more luxurious lifestyle after default because they did, in fact, bargain
for this right through their choice of borrowing; they deserve more gen-
erous debt relief because they purchased a more generous insurance pol-
icy through the way in which they structured their borrowing.314 For ex-
ample, assume Brian lives in a state with an unlimited homestead
exemption and needs to borrow a total of $200,000 from some combina-
tion of Unsecured Financeco and Secured Bank. Brian can borrow up to
$150,000, the value of his home, from Secured Bank on a fully secured
basis. Because Brian grants Secured Bank a mortgage, Secured Bank is
virtually guaranteed repayment and thus will charge a much lower rate
than Unsecured Financeco. Brian may, however, rationally choose to
borrow much less than $150,000 from Secured Bank, because by borrow-
ing from Unsecured Financeco he effectively buys more default protec-
tion.315 If he suffers some misfortune, then he can use his exempt equity
to support his lifestyle.
One must be careful not to oversell this argument, as the justifica-
tion for the default rules is based on the premise that it is costly to con-
tract; therefore, debtors and creditors may have difficulty choosing the
level of relief that they desire. Of course, it is very easy to grant a se-
cured interest in a fixed asset like a home and thus one may not be too
concerned with the costs of contracting. However, the argument be-
comes much more tenuous once one introduces prebankruptcy planning
that erodes the ability of a debtor to effectively waive the use of an ex-
emption.316
VI. DEBT RELIEF AND SOCIAL INSURANCE
This article argues that if debt relief laws are designed to insure
debtors against misfortune, one can defend laws that allow wealthier
debtors to maintain a standard of living beyond the reach of the poor by
noting that wealthier individuals typically insure a higher standard of liv-
ing for themselves. This argument requires qualifications. First, consider
who bears the costs of these laws. To the extent costs are borne by soci-
ety generally, the argument in favor of generosity for the wealthy and the
314. This argument is a derivation of Ponoroff and Knippenberg's defense of prebankruptcy
planning in which they argue that courts should not question prebankruptcy planning because credi-
tors could have bargained for the right to prevent such planning by taking a security interest, pre-
sumably in exchange for a lower interest rate, but did not do so. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the
Fresh Start, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995).
315. See generally id.
316. A thorough discussion of prebankruptcy planning and exemptions would require a long di-
gression beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 314.
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middle class is substantially weakened.317 Second, consider the form of
market failure that justifies government intervention. Some forms of
market failure do justify inequality in debt relief.318 If debt relief is in-
tended merely to keep insolvent debtors from draining the public fisc or
rioting in the streets, however, one can force the wealthy and the middle
class to endure the same miserable standard of living as the poor.319
The threat that a debtor may become a drain on the public fisc re-
minds us that the government has adopted other mechanisms, including
income transfer programs, that shield individuals from the consequences
of misfortune.32 Since at least the 1950s, scholars have understood that
bankruptcy is part of a larger social safety net.321 Recently, scholars have
tried to draw useful analogies between the debate over bankruptcy re-
form and the debate over the reform of social assistance programs, like
public housing or Temporary Aid for Needy Families (formerly Aid for
Families with Dependent Children).322
Even though some social assistance programs, such as Medicare, in-
sure the poor against specific risks and all social assistance programs can
provide some measure of insurance by guaranteeing an individual a
minimum standard of living, they provide a fairly sharp contrast with ex-
isting debt relief laws because they limit aid to the truly poor and seem
designed to provide all recipients with roughly the same minimal stan-
dard of living. 323 This contrast can be partly attributed to the fact that
these programs primarily serve goals other than insurance, goals for
which debt relief laws are ill-suited.
Other programs, such as unemployment insurance or social security,
commonly called social insurance programs,324 provide a much closer
analogy to debt relief. These programs do not restrict relief to the poor.
In fact, like debt relief laws, these programs typically provide benefits
that increase with the recipient's income before she suffered the misfor-
tune against which she purchased insurance.325 Unlike some forms of
317. See supra Section IV.
318. See supra Sections V.B, V.C.
319. See supra Section V.A.
320. See supra Section V.A.
321. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 1497-1502. For a more recent work revisiting this theme,
see SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10.
322. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 17 (1999); A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243 (2001).
323. The programs sometimes allow recipients to consume slightly more in order to provide them
with an incentive to work. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income Mainte-
nance Programmes, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 187, 190 (1995).
324. Alan B. Krueger & Bruce D. Meyer, Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance, in 4 HAND-
BOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2239-40 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) ("For our
purposes, social insurance programs are defined as compulsory, contributory government programs
that provide benefits to individuals if certain conditions are met.... Other programs that are consid-
ered social insurance: Social Security retirement benefits, Disability Insurance (DI), Unemployment
Insurance and Workers' Compensation (WC) Insurance.").
325. See infra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
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debt relief, however, increases in the debtor's income beyond a fairly
modest amount produce little, if any, increase in the benefits provided by
these programs.31 6 Therefore, a defense of bankruptcy abuse, or the use
of debt relief by the wealthy and upper-middle class to finance a lifestyle
beyond the means of average Americans, must either argue that these
programs are wrongly structured or that debt relief is relevantly differ-
ent.
A. Placing Debt Relief Within the Larger Social Safety Net
Welfare economists typically advance three fundamental arguments
in favor of government transfer programs: (i) transfers redistribute
wealth from rich to poor and thus enhance equity or fairness in society;
(ii) transfers to those in need satisfy the altruistic concerns of society
generally; and (iii) transfer programs provide social insurance.3 27  The
third goal requires little elaboration beyond the discussion of Section III,
however, the first two goals require some explanation.
Given the notoriously vague concepts of "fairness" or "equity,"
economists often formalize the fairness argument by reasoning that be-
cause the poor have less money than the wealthy, the poor value it more
highly, and the government can increase aggregate social welfare by re-
distributing wealth or income from the wealthy to the poor.3" The altru-
ism argument posits that individuals care about the well-being of their
fellow citizens, and ,therefore, the wealthy may want to transfer money
to the poor.32 9 Of course, the altruist can help the poor through private
charity, but each altruist would prefer that her neighbor make the neces-
sary donations. Poverty relief is effectively a public good and the gov-
ernment may improve on the market solution by forcing all individuals to
contribute.33 °
Debt relief laws provide a poor tool for achieving the goals of eq-
uity and altruism for two reasons. First, debt relief laws only protect the
assets and income that an individual has, and the poor, by definition, lack
income and assets.33 ' Debt relief laws may prevent those who once en-
326. See infra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 151, at 193.
328. Id. Scholars sometimes criticize this argument for assuming that the government can com-
pare the happiness of different individuals. One common response to this criticism is to effectively
recharacterize the utilitarian argument as a form of insurance: insurance against the lottery of birth
that leaves some individuals wealthy and others poor. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Wel-
fare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John C. Harsanyi, Car-
dinal Welfare, Individualist Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309
(1955); see also A.B. Atkinson, Income Maintenance and Social Insurance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS, supra note 324, at 779, 791-95.
329. See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 258, at 543.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 15, at 770 ("Another general defect of exemption laws is that
they tend to perpetuate our economic class structure. Those who have are allowed to keep; those who
do not are given nothing."). One early bankruptcy commentator suggested that the government pro-
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joyed a higher standard of living from falling into poverty, but this is just
a manifestation of the insurance role of debt relief discussed above.3 32 In
addition, strong debt relief laws are likely to result in higher interest
rates and reduced access to credit, thus leaving debtors to bear much of
the cost of the relief that they will receive. 33 Debt relief laws could effec-
tuate a transfer from rich debtors to poor debtors if the poor tend to
make greater use of debt relief than the rich and lenders do not view the
rich and poor as relevantly different, or at least not different enough to
justify the expense needed to distinguish between them.33' As suggested
above, this is unlikely to be the case.335
The limitation of debt relief, or at least bankruptcy, as a tool for
fighting poverty is further illustrated by the fact that the primary benefi-
ciaries of bankruptcy are not the poor, but the middle class,336 and by the
contrast between debt relief and those programs that are primarily de-
signed to alleviate poverty, such as Temporary Aid for Needy Families
(TANF), Supplementary Security Income, the Earned Income Tax
Credit, Medicaid, or the Food Stamp Program. These programs are
sometimes referred to as "means-tested programs" to distinguish them
from the social insurance programs discussed below.337 As their name
indicates, these means-tested programs generally restrict benefits to
those who are defined as "poor" by income and asset tests, though many
programs further restrict eligibility by requiring additional characteris-
tics, such as disability. 338 Consistent with their goal of poverty relief,
these programs are designed to provide recipients with only enough
benefits to maintain a minimal standard of living, though programs
sometimes allow individuals to fund a slightly higher standard of living
out of additional earnings as an incentive to work.3 9 Finally, consistent
with a goal of redistribution or an effort at providing a public good, these
programs are typically funded by general tax revenues.'
Debt relief laws have none of these three characteristics. Aside
from judges' salaries and certain other administrative expenses, debt re-
lief is not financed by the public fisc, but by the cancellation of creditor's
vide a transfer to low-income debtors to remedy this problem. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 1506-
07. This commentator gave no reason for why this transfer should be restricted to those who file for
bankruptcy rather than the poor generally.
332. See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
333. See supra Section IV.
334. Id.
335. Id.; accord Hallinan, supra note 20, at 135 ("Thus, any subsidization of the cost of credit for
high-risk, low-income borrowers will most frequently be at the expense of other high-risk, low-income
borrowers, while the cost of any subsidize to low-risk, high-income borrowers will usually be borne by
others with similar risk and income characteristics.").
336. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 22-32.
337. See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 151, at 253 ("Social insurance programs differ from means-
tested programs in several ways.").
338. See, e.g., id. at 230-37.
339. See Besley & Coate, supra note 323, at 190.
340. See Barr, supra note 283, at 768.
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contract rights.3"1 The factual premise of this article is that debt relief
laws sometimes protect the very wealthy and allow some debtors to
maintain a lifestyle that far exceeds any plausible definition of poverty.342
One might object that the pending bankruptcy legislation will move
bankruptcy closer to the means-tested government transfer programs,
but the level of income at which the reforms would invoke means-testing
is so much greater than the level used by means-tested social assistance
programs that it is qualitatively different. Consistent with their role in
poverty relief, means-tested social assistance programs deny relief to all
but the truly poor. Although the qualifying income levels for TANF vary
significantly from state to state, 4 on average a family of three must have
an income less than $700 per month to qualify.' By contrast, means-
testing in bankruptcy applies only to those debtors with income above
the relevant median; nationally, the median household income for a fam-
ily of four is about $5,000 per month.345
Social insurance programs, such as social security and unemploy-
ment insurance, provide a much better analogy to debt relief laws. In
theory these programs are financed by separate taxes on potential recipi-
ents that are paid into special funds and are not to be used for general
government purposes. 6 More significantly, these programs do not re-
strict benefits to the poor; in fact, these programs typically restrict bene-
fits to those who have actually paid into the system over a period of fairly
stable employment, and thus the programs may exclude the chronically
341. For example, in 1992, the federal government spent approximately 389 million dollars to run
the bankruptcy system. See David A. Skeel, Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corpo-
rate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 525 (1994). Of course, this provides an imperfect measure of
the cost incurred by the government from consumer debt relief and collections; corporations may also
file for bankruptcy, and bankruptcy is but a small part of a larger system of debt relief that also in-
cludes federal and state limitations on nonbankruptcy collections. See supra Section I.A. It is point-
less, however, to try to estimate this cost more accurately because the amount of debt charged-off as
uncollectible is an order of greater magnitude. For example, in 1992, commercial banks charged-off
(net of recoveries) over six billion dollars in credit card loans to individuals as uncollectible, and by
2002 this amount had risen to over sixteen billion dollars. FDIC, STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTI-
TUTIONS, at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main4.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
342. See supra Section 1.
343. For example, in Arkansas applicants with monthly earnings above $247 do not quality for
TANF regardless of family size, but in Hawaii a family of four may have earnings of $2,544 and still
qualify. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, TANF CASH ASSISTANCE: CATEGORICAL AND
FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY RULES, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/cat-fin.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2003). In Virginia, the gross income limit for those subject to the time and work requirements is set at
the federal poverty guideline; for a family of four, this income limit is $1,371. Id.
344. Id.
345. Median household income is about $62,000 per year. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 4-PERSON
FAMILIES, supra note 34.
346. See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 151, at 253; Krueger & Meyer, supra note 324, at 2239 ("In gen-
eral, social insurance programs are funded by dedicated taxes or premiums, and have compulsory cov-
erage."). Of course, as the famous "lock-box" debates of the 2000 Presidential election demonstrated,
reality sometimes departs from this theory.
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poor.347 For the purposes of this article, however, the most crucial fact
about social insurance programs is that they typically provide more gen-
erous benefits to individuals with a history of higher earnings, even
though one cannot plausibly argue that this inequality provides recipients
with an incentive to work harder.3" An individual with average earnings
will receive approximately sixty-five percent greater Old-Age and Re-
tirement benefits than an individual with just forty-five percent of aver-
age earnings. 34 9 Unemployment insurance varies significantly from state
to state, but usually increases with an individual's average weekly
wage.35° For example, a single Virginian without children earning $11.00
an hour would receive roughly double the weekly unemployment bene-
fits of a Virginian earning just $5.50 an hour, $313 versus $157.351 More-
over, these characteristics are shared by countries outside of the United
States; earnings-related benefits appear to be the dominant form of un-
employment insurance and government pensions in the developed
world.352
Of course, society does not have to structure debt relief as a social
insurance program; some forms of public insurance, like Medicaid, are
indeed means-tested and restricted to the truly poor.353 Society may ra-
tionally decide to adopt this approach to debt relief if it decides that the
sole purpose of debt relief is to prevent social unrest and mitigate the
Samaritan's dilemma described in Section V.A. However, no one seri-
ously advances this position in the current debate over bankruptcy re-
form.
B. The Bounded Relief of Social Insurance
Despite the fact that social insurance benefits generally rise with an
individual's earnings history, increases in earnings beyond a fairly modest
amount typically have little if any impact on benefits because the rate of
increase falls sharply or benefits are capped at some amount. Earnings
above $84,900 have no effect on Old-Age and Survivor's benefits, 354 and
347. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 275, at 336-37 ("Because [unemployment insurance] explicitly
links eligibility to 'labor force attachment,' and narrowly construes what counts as involuntary unem-
ployment, it may exclude nontraditional workers from benefits.").
348. See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 151, at 253. For a discussion of the effects of social insurance on
labor supply, see, for example, Krueger & Meyer, supra note 324.
349. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY (2002), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast-facts/2002/ff2OO2.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
350. See, e.g., Econ. Policy Inst., supra note 274.
351. Id.
352. See Barr, supra note 283, at 777 (presenting table summarizing benefits in selected developed
countries).
353. See, e.g., Krueger & Meyer, supra note 324, at 2230 ("Medicaid receipt is available to all in-
dividuals with sufficiently low income.").
354. SoC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 349, at 9-22. The recipient's benefits are calculated from her
primary insurance amount. This primary insurance amount is equal to ninety percent of the individ-
ual's first $592 of averaged indexed monthly earnings (AIME) plus thirty two percent of AIME over
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workers who earned this amount receive benefits that are just thirteen
percent higher than a worker earning just sixty-two percent of this
amount ($51,514)."5' Single Virginians receive the maximum $368 in
weekly unemployment benefits whether they earn $13.00 an hour or sub-
stantially more.1
51
It is tempting to attribute the limits on relief for the more wealthy
members of society to an attempt at redistribution. Though nominally a
form of insurance, there is no requirement that the taxes the government
imposes to fund a social insurance program be commensurate with the
expected benefit that each individual receives. This makes it possible for
the government to use these programs to redistribute wealth from rich to
poor by setting taxes and benefits. By contrast, the government cannot
readily use debt relief to redistribute from rich to poor because it only
controls the benefits a debtor receives, not the premium the debtor pays
for this benefit. As discussed above, these premiums are set in private
markets, and, to the extent that the highly competitive consumer credit
markets are well-functioning, debtors will on average pay a premium
commensurate with the debt relief that she expects to receive.357
This distinction between debt relief and social insurance programs
provides only a partial explanation for the egalitarianism of transfer pro-
grams. First, it does not appear that governments, or at least govern-
ments within the United States,3 58 structure the social insurance programs
to effectuate massive redistribution from rich to poor. Although social
insurance benefits do not increase proportionally with income, neither do
the taxes that individuals or their employers must pay. For example, the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act only assesses a payroll tax on the first
$7000 of an employee's earnings,3 59 and although some states use a larger
base, none assess unemployment taxes on a base larger than $29,300."6
In addition, individuals pay social security taxes only on their first
$84,900 of earned income.36' If viewed as a program, then Social Security
might effect some redistribution from rich to poor, as some claim that
lower income Americans generally receive larger benefits per dollar of
tax paid than do high-income Americans. But this effect is rather modest
$592 through $4,567 plus fifteen percent of AIME over $3,567 through the maximum taxable earnings.
Id.
355. Id.
356. Econ. Policy Inst., supra note 274. Unemployment insurance in other states follows this
same general pattern, though benefits and caps vary significantly. Id.
357. See supra Section IV.
358. Some countries structure their social insurance programs to effectuate more significant redis-
tribution. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 283, at 777.
359. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b)(1) (2000).
360. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT LAWS tbl.200, available
at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/2001ch200.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
361. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 349.
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relative to the amount that this program redistributes from young to old
or even from single workers to one-income married households.362
This same limitation on benefits is shared by another major form of
mandatory insurance program that in the United States is not typically
financed by the public fisc: workers' compensation. Workers' compen-
sation serves as a form of mandatory insurance because the employee is
guaranteed some compensation for her injuries regardless of fault.363
Employers have numerous methods of insuring themselves against the
risk of having to pay this compensation: depending on the particular
state's requirements, employers may participate in a state sponsored or
mandated program, they can contract for insurance in the private mar-
ket, or they can self-insure (which just means that they prove that they
have the financial resources to pay any claim made by their employ-
ees).3" As long as the party obligated to make the payment is solvent,
these details are largely irrelevant to the employee; from her perspective
the method the employer chooses to spread the risk is analogous to the
purchase of reinsurance by her automobile insurance company.365 If the
government leaves the pricing of this reinsurance to the market, then
employers should pay insurance rates roughly equal to the expected
benefits that their employees will receive.
Just as the debtor bears some of the cost of debt relief laws through
higher interest rates, employees are likely to bear some of the cost of
workers' compensation through reduced wages.3" Therefore, like debt
relief, it is possible that excessively generous workers' compensation laws
may actually make the employee worse off, and what is excessively gen-
erous will depend in part on how much the employee earns. Perhaps be-
cause of this, workers' compensation benefits generally increase with the
recipient's prior wage; in the vast majority of states, workers' compensa-
362. A "low earnings" single male retiring in 1995 received benefits roughly equal to 125% of the
taxes that he paid while a "maximum earning" single male received benefits of approximately seventy-
five percent of taxes paid. BRUCE, supra note 151, at 260. A low-earnings, one-earner couple retiring
in 1995 received benefits of approximately 300% of taxes paid and a low-earnings single male retiring
in 1965 received benefits equal to approximately 500% of taxes paid. Id.
363. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2001).
364. 9 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 150.01[21 (3d ed. 2000). Some states require employers to post a bond or otherwise set aside funds if
they wish to self-insure. Id.
365. Insurance companies often purchase reinsurance to protect against shocks that will cause a
loss in a significant portion of their policies.
366. Like debt relief laws, worker's compensation may actually represent a net benefit to workers
and employers if it solves some form of market failure. Dissatisfaction with our nation's costly tort
litigation system provides a major justification for the enactment of worker's compensation programs.
See, e.g., DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILs: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER
163-64 (2002). Because worker's compensation limits the ability of the employee to sue, it is possible
that the law results in higher wages even though the debtor receives greater expected benefits for each
injury. Still, the benefits provided by worker's compensation should decrease the wages paid to the
employee. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workers' Compensation: Wage Effects, Bene-fit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249 (1987).
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tion replaces two-thirds of a recipient's lost income.367 Like social assis-
tance programs, however, workers' compensation provides benefits that
do not necessarily increase proportionally with income. For example,
Virginia provides a minimum weekly benefit amount of $170.25 and a
maximum weekly benefit amount of $681 for those workers who earn
more than approximately $51,000 annually.368
C. Should Debt Relief Be Different?
Debt relief laws, like social insurance programs, provide benefits to
the average American that allow her to maintain a lifestyle unavailable
to the truly poor despite similar misfortune. Though social insurance
programs provide the wealthy and upper-middle class with roughly the
same benefits as the average American, debt relief laws enable the
wealthy and the upper-middle class to continue lifestyles that the average
American cannot afford.
As noted in Section I, proposed bankruptcy reforms would reduce
(but not eliminate) the latter form of inequality but leave the first form
intact, and thus can be seen as attempts to conform debt relief with other
forms of social insurance. By its terms, the proposed means-testing does
not apply to the "average" American3 69 and thus does not affect her abil-
ity to enjoy a higher standard of living than the truly poor after default;
means-testing is designed to prevent the upper-middle class from enjoy-
ing a standard of living beyond the reach of the average American. Even
if it applies, a cap on the homestead exemption of $125,000 per debtor, or
$250,000 for a married couple, will not affect the vast majority of Ameri-
cans, as most Americans simply do not own this amount in tangible as-
sets, or, if they do, they will have pledged most of these assets to secured
creditors and thus cannot exempt them.37°
To say that the proposed bankruptcy reforms help conform debt re-
lief to the structure of social insurance programs does not mean that
these reforms are necessarily desirable or that further reform is justified.
Alternatively, one can defend the generosity of debt relief laws by argu-
ing that debt relief is somehow different than other forms of social insur-
ance. Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook seem to embrace this
possibility, arguing that debt relief laws complement other forms of so-
cial insurance by insuring against many of the same risks that govern-
ment transfer programs are designed to protect against.371 Yet, even if
one adopts the view that debt relief and transfer programs serve as com-
367. See, e.g., VA. WORKER'S COMP. COMM'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS, available at http://
www.vwc.state.va.us/bene-amts.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
368. Id.
369. Means-testing only applies to those with income above the applicable median. See Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 102 (2002).
370. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (reporting figures on home equity).
371. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 252-61.
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plements, one still needs a theory to explain why upper-income Ameri-
cans are asked to rely on debt relief rather than transfer programs.
Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 4uggest that the
American middle class must rely on bankruptcy for protection against
misfortune because bankruptcy provides a "market-driven choice to deal
with privatized, rather than socialized, risk." '372 It is not clear, however,
why they characterize bankruptcy in this manner. A creditor is free to
lend or not lend to a debtor, but she is not free to lend on terms that do
not include the possibility of a bankruptcy discharge that will force her to
bear some of the costs of the debtor's misfortune.373 In this way, debt re-
lief is no more "market-based" than other aspects of the social safety net.
An employer is free to hire or not hire a worker. But if she hires a
worker, the employer must give the employee the right to claim benefits
if the employer fires the employee (unemployment insurance) or the
employee is injured on the job (workers' compensation). The employer
will often bear some of the costs of the employee's misfortune either be-
cause it chose to self-insure or because it will be forced to pay higher un-
employment insurance taxes or workers' compensation premiums.
Perhaps an explanation is provided by the seminal article on exemp-
tion reform, a student note published in 1959.3" 4 Recognizing that ex-
emptions or debt relief generally would do little good for those that had
no significant assets or income to protect,375 this student called for trans-
fer payments to the poor in bankruptcy.376 If Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook are correct in asserting that transfer programs and bank-
ruptcy provide insurance against the same basic risks, then the system
proposed by the student commentator does not differ markedly from our
current system. Allowing the wealthy to retain at least some of their sub-
stantial assets and income after they experience some form of misfortune
may provide enough insurance for them, and they do not need transfer
programs like unemployment insurance or workers' compensation to
provide benefits that are a large fraction of their income. As one moves
down the socioeconomic ladder, individuals have progressively less assets
on which to rely to see them through difficult times. Therefore, these in-
dividuals need a much larger replacement of their lost income.
372. Id. at 260.
373. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law As Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 416-
17 (2001).
374. See Note, supra note 12.
375. Id. at 1506 ("Finally, exemptions, no matter how computed, are of no help to the bankrupt
who lacks the figurative shirt on his back.").
376. Id. at 1506-07.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Many in Coygress argue that bankruptcy reform is necessary to stop
abuse.377 To define abuse, however, one must first determine the proper
use of bankruptcy and other forms of debt relief. This article follows the
literature and assumes that debt relief laws provide needed insurance
against misfortune generally. Viewed in this light, some of the proposed
reforms are long overdue. For example, amendments limiting the ability
of a debtor to use debt relief to avoid the consequences of her own inten-
tional misconduct serve merely to conform bankruptcy to other forms of
insurance.378
This article addresses whether the continuation of a luxurious life-
style after default constitutes an abuse of debt relief, and concludes that
one may make a plausible argument that it does not.37 9 Equalizing the
standard of living of all defaulting debtors would be equivalent to forcing
each debtor to purchase the same insurance against the hardships that
lead to default and sentencing each debtor to a Procrustean bed that
would fit only a few. This argument in favor of inequality is merely plau-
sible, however, because one may raise legitimate questions about the un-
derlying assumptions. For example, one may believe that the costs of the
generous debt relief bestowed on the very wealthy are borne by other
debtors or consumers more generally.3" One may also believe that the
market failure that makes debt relief necessary does not justify the full
extent of relief that the law currently provides.38'
Embracing these arguments against the relief offered to the very
wealthy affects the justifications for the relief given the middle class, as
well. In particular, the same market failure arguments used to justify the
generous relief bestowed on the wealthy are also necessary to justify the
relief bestowed on the middle class, and the argument that defaults by
relatively wealthy individuals may raise costs for those less-well-off ap-
plies with greater force to the middle class. In short, fully embracing the
arguments against the generous debt relief afforded the very wealthy
377. See, e.g., The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001: Hearing on S. 420 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong., available at Lexis, Federal News Service File; Pamela Barnett, Hatch Hopes
Bankruptcy Reform Markup to Finish Today, CONG. DAILY, Feb. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL
4817746; Pamela Barnett, Schumer Says Bankruptcy Move Now up to House GOP, CONG. DAILY,
Aug. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24878029.
378. For example, the recent reforms limit the ability of a debtor to claim a homestead exemption
after certain bad acts and limit the ability of the debtor to obtain a discharge of willful and malicious
acts that result in death or personal injury. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b) (2002).
379. To be clear, this article does not necessarily reject the need for exemption reform or means-
testing. Further exemption reform may address the problem of prebankruptcy planning and means-
testing may provide a sensible method of determining which cases deserve greater judicial scrutiny.
This article merely argues that the continuation of a luxurious lifestyle after default may not be suffi-
cient for a finding of abuse.
380. See supra Section IV.
381. See supra Section V.
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may logically lead to a world in which bankruptcy seeks only to save us
from the abject poverty that our poorest citizens must endure.
TABLE 1: EXEMPTIONS FOR MARRIED COUPLE382
Allows Home Any Allows Home Any
State Federal Equity Property State Federal Equity Property
Fed N/A 34,850 17,500 MT 100,000 0
AL 10,000 6,000 NE 12,500 2,500
AK 64,800 0 NV 125,000 0
AZ 100,000 0 NH Yes 60,000 16,000
AR Yes Unlimited 500 NJ Yes 0 2,000
CA 75,000 30,800 NM Yes 60,000 5,000
CO 60,000 0 NY 20,000 0
CT Yes 150,000 2,000 NC 20,000 8,000
DE None 10,000 ND 80,000 7,500
FL Unlimited 2,000 OH 10,000 800
GA 20,000 11,200 OK Unlimited 0
HI Yes 50,000 0 OR 33,000 800
ID 50,000 1,600 PA Yes None 300
IL 15,000 4,000 RI Yes 150,000 0
IN 15,000 8,000 SC 10,000 2,000
IA Unlimited 100 SD Unlimited 10.000
KS Unlimited 0 TN 7,500 8,000
KY 10,000 2,000 TX Yes Unlimited 0
LA 25,000 0 UT 40,000 0
ME 25,000 12,800 VT Yes 150,000 14,800
MD 11,000 11,000 VA 10,000 10,000
MA Yes 300,000 0 WA Yes 40,000 2,000
MI Yes 7,000 0 WV 50,000 51,600
MN Yes 200,000 0 WI Yes 40,000 2,000
MS 150,000 10,000 WY 20,000 0
MO 8,000 1,650 1
382. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 43; STEPHEN ELIAS ET AL., How TO FILE FOR CHAPTER 7 BANK-
RUPTCY app. 1/3-1/29 (10th ed. 2002).
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